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Executive summary 
A franchise is an arrangement in which a ‘brand’ owner—the franchisor—allows a franchisee to trade under that 
brand and typically either allows, or requires, the franchisee to use the franchisor’s business and marketing 
systems.   
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) and the Franchising Code of Conduct (the Code), which is made 
under the CCA, apply to franchises.  
A common characteristic of franchises is that there is an imbalance of power between franchisors and 
franchisees.  Amongst other reasons, this stems from franchisors generally being better resourced and having a 
deeper understanding of the business than franchisees, as well as having the upper hand in contract 
negotiations. 
Between 2006 and 2008 there were five inquiries at the Commonwealth and state levels into franchising, which 
sought to address allegations of misuse of power by franchisors. The most significant of these reviews was 
carried out by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, the report of which, 
entitled Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, called for significant 
legislative amendments. 
Amendments were made to the Code in 2007 and 2010, following which the former Labor Government stated 
that it did not intend to conduct any further reviews before 2013. On 4 January 2013, the Government 
appointed Alan Wein to review the Code with particular focus on: 
• the efficacy of the amendments that had been made to the Code in 2007 and 2010 and  
• other matters such as good faith in franchising, the rights of franchisees at the end of the term of their 
franchise agreements, including recognition for any contribution they have made to the building of the 
franchise and the operation of the provisions of the CCA as they relate to enforcement of the Code. 
This research paper considers the rationale for many of the recommendations of the Wein review and examines 
whether the former Government’s mooted legislative amendments would effectively address an imbalance in 
the franchise relationship or be likely to tip the balance in favour of one party to the franchise agreement. 
 
  
ISSN 1834-9854 
 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
Executive summary ..................................................................................... 1 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 5 
What is franchising? .................................................................................... 5 
Types of franchising ............................................................................................ 5 
An unbalanced relationship ................................................................................ 6 
Reviews of franchising ................................................................................. 6 
Matthews review (2006) .................................................................................... 6 
South Australia (2007) ........................................................................................ 7 
Western Australia (2007) ................................................................................... 7 
Federal Government: Opportunity not opportunism report (2008) .................. 7 
Expert panel (2010) ..................................................................................... 8 
Wein review (2013) ..................................................................................... 8 
Recurring key issues ........................................................................................... 9 
Key issue—disclosure .................................................................................. 9 
Importance of disclosure .................................................................................... 9 
Current disclosure requirements........................................................................ 9 
Disclosure of rights to compete with franchisee online ................................... 10 
Wein review recommendation....................................................................... 11 
Government response.................................................................................. 11 
Comment ...................................................................................................... 11 
Disclosure of unforeseen capital expenditure .................................................. 11 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 11 
Wein report recommendation ....................................................................... 12 
Government response.................................................................................. 12 
Comment ...................................................................................................... 12 
Disclosure about marketing funds .................................................................... 13 
Limitations of the Code .................................................................................. 13 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 14 
Wein review recommendation—use of marketing funds .............................. 14 
Government response.................................................................................. 14 
Comments .................................................................................................... 14 
Wein review recommendation—accounting for marketing funds ................ 14 
Government response.................................................................................. 14 
Comments .................................................................................................... 14 
Disclosure of risk before entering into an agreement ...................................... 15 
Wein review recommendation....................................................................... 15 
Government response.................................................................................. 16 
Comment—reading and understanding the disclosure document.............. 16 
Key issue—franchisor failure ....................................................................... 16 
 
 
Franchising in Australia: striking a balance or tipping the balance? 2 
 
Nature of the problem...................................................................................... 16 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 17 
Wein recommendation .................................................................................. 18 
Government response.................................................................................. 18 
Comment—franchisee’s right to terminate ................................................. 18 
Comment—right to be a creditor ................................................................. 19 
Comment—whether there is a need to reform insolvency laws ................. 19 
Key issue—good faith in franchising ............................................................ 20 
The duty of good faith ...................................................................................... 20 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 21 
Wein review recommendation....................................................................... 21 
Government response.................................................................................. 22 
Comment—whether a list of behaviours is of assistance ............................ 22 
Key issue—transfer, renewal and end of term arrangements ....................... 23 
Franchisors impeding transfer of franchise by franchisees .............................. 23 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 24 
Novation or transfer ..................................................................................... 24 
Wein review recommendation....................................................................... 24 
Government response.................................................................................. 25 
Renewal and end of term arrangements ......................................................... 25 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 25 
Franchisee rights to payment for goodwill .................................................. 26 
Wein review recommendation....................................................................... 26 
Government response.................................................................................. 26 
Comment—applying the common law ........................................................ 27 
Key issue—dispute resolution ..................................................................... 27 
Dispute resolution behaviours ......................................................................... 27 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 27 
State based small business commissioners .................................................... 28 
Wein review recommendation....................................................................... 28 
Government response.................................................................................. 28 
Comment ...................................................................................................... 29 
Key issues—attribution of legal costs to franchisees .................................... 29 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 29 
Wein review recommendation....................................................................... 30 
Government response.................................................................................. 30 
Comment—costs of dispute resolution ....................................................... 30 
Key issue—enforcement ............................................................................. 30 
Current regulatory framework—Commonwealth ............................................ 30 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments ............................................................. 31 
Audit power .................................................................................................... 31 
ACCC compliance and enforcement policy .................................................... 31 
 
 
Franchising in Australia: striking a balance or tipping the balance? 3 
 
Wein recommendation—civil pecuniary penalties ........................................ 32 
Government response.................................................................................. 32 
Comment—pros and cons of civil pecuniary penalties ................................ 32 
Comment—lack of consistency across jurisdictions .................................... 33 
Wein review recommendation—infringement notices and audit powers .... 33 
Government response.................................................................................. 33 
Wein review recommendation—court orders ............................................... 33 
Government response.................................................................................. 34 
Comment—departure from other industry codes ....................................... 34 
Future review ............................................................................................. 34 
Conclusion ................................................................................................. 34 
Appendix 1 ................................................................................................. 36 
Appendix 2 ................................................................................................. 38 
Appendix 3 ................................................................................................. 39 
Appendix 4 ................................................................................................. 40 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements: thanks to my colleagues Robert Dolamore and Jonathan Chowns for their 
constructive criticism and comments on an earlier draft of this paper and to Catherine Lorimer for her 
skilful editing.  
 
 
Franchising in Australia: striking a balance or tipping the balance? 4 
 
Introduction 
The object of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA) is to promote competition and fair trading and to 
provide for consumer protection.1 The CCA includes a number of provisions that concern the franchising sector.2 
The Franchising Code of Conduct (the Code) was made under Part IVB of the CCA, which provides a framework 
for industry codes generally.3 The Code aims to address one feature of franchise arrangements that is said to 
cause problems; that the franchisor usually has access to better information about the business and its 
prospects than the franchisee. The Code aims to strike a balance between mandating best practice in relation to 
disclosure and not unduly constraining the operation of the market.  
Generally speaking, regulation must give stakeholders certainty and confidence. Government’s role is to provide 
protection for vulnerable groups and people and to regulate against conduct and behaviour which is improper, 
unacceptable and unlawful.4 The franchising industry is based on commercial arrangements in which both 
franchisors and franchisees bear some risk. The challenge for government in seeking to regulate conduct in the 
franchising industry, either through the CCA or the Code, is to strike a balance which protects potentially 
vulnerable franchisees without attempting to eliminate all risk for them. 
This research paper considers the rationale for many of the recommendations of the Wein review and examines 
whether the former Government’s mooted legislative amendments would effectively address an imbalance in 
the franchise relationship or be likely to tip the balance in favour of one party to the franchise agreement. 
What is franchising? 
Franchising is a business relationship in which the franchisor (the owner of the business providing the product or 
service) assigns to independent people (the franchisees) the right to market and distribute the franchisor’s goods or 
service, and to use the business name for a fixed period of time. The International Franchise Association defines 
franchising as a “continuing relationship in which the franchisor provides a licensed privilege to do business, plus 
assistance in organising training, merchandising and management in return for a consideration from the 
franchisee”.5 
Types of franchising 
The term ‘franchising’ is used to describe a number of business models including: 
• manufacturer-retailer: where the retailer as franchisee sells the franchisor’s product directly to the public 
• manufacturer-wholesaler: where the franchisee under license manufactures and distributes the franchisor’s 
product  
• wholesaler-retailer: where the retailer as franchisee purchases products for retail sale from a franchisor 
wholesaler and 
• retailer-retailer: where the franchisor markets a service, or a product, under a common name and 
standardised system, through a network of franchisees. This is the classic business format franchise which is 
the most popular of franchising types. 
The business format franchise operates through the use of a format, or a comprehensive system for the conduct 
of the business, including such elements as business planning, management system, location, appearance and 
image and quality of goods. Standardisation, consistency and uniformity across all aspects are hallmarks of the 
business format franchise.6 
According to the 2012 Franchising Survey undertaken by the Asia-Pacific Centre for Franchising Excellence: 
1.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 2, accessed 24 October 2013. 
2.  The laws which support the franchising sector are discussed in detail under the heading ‘Enforcement’ in this Research Paper. 
3.  Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulations 1998, accessed 24 October 2013. 
4.  A Wein, Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, Canberra, 2013, p. vii, accessed 24 October 2013. 
5.  Franchise Council of Australia website, ‘What is franchising?‘, accessed 24 October 2013. 
6.  Ibid. 
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• there are approximately 1,180 business format franchisors in Australia in 2012, compared with 1,025 in 2010 
and 1,100 in 2008 
• the decline in the franchise sector that occurred during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and subsequent 
economic downturn in Australia between 2008 and 2010 has shifted into recovery mode with a return to net 
growth in the sector 
• there are an estimated 73,000 units operating in business format franchises, reflecting an increase of four per 
cent during the recovery phase 
• the net growth in franchising has occurred predominantly in non-retail industries and 
• more than 400,000 people are employed directly in franchising.7   
An unbalanced relationship 
The franchising relationship is commonly not evenly balanced. The franchisor generally has greater power 
because it is better resourced, owns or controls the intellectual property (including trade marks) relating to the 
franchise business, prepares the franchise agreement which may be offered to a potential franchisee on a ‘take 
it or leave it’ basis, has broad and detailed knowledge of the business and its prospects and may control the 
supply of materials and other inputs to the franchisee. 
Despite the popularity of franchising in Australia, there has been significant and often very public complaints 
made about the operation of the franchising sector. First and foremost those complaints have been about the 
extent and completeness of disclosure.8 In addition, there have been accusations of improper conduct by 
franchisors such as churning,9 and restrictions on assignment.10 Other grievances have dealt with the issue of 
dispute resolution and the willingness of attendees to fully participate in the process.11 Finally, there have been 
myriad criticisms about the lack of enforceability of the Code.12 
It is this on-going level of complaints within an apparently popular business model that has given rise to a 
number of high level reviews.13    
Reviews of franchising 
Matthews review (2006) 
Graeme Matthews led a review of the operation of the disclosure provisions of the Code in 2006 (the Matthews 
review). The aim of that review was to identify ways that the Code could be improved. The report by the 
Matthews Committee (the Matthews report), containing 27 separate recommendations, was delivered to the 
then Minister for Small Business and Tourism in October 2006.14  
The Howard Government responded to the report in February 2007, agreeing to 15 of the recommendations and 
agreeing in principle with six others.15  
7.  L Frazer, S Weaven and K Bodey, Franchising Australia 2012, Griffith University, 2012, p. 2, accessed 24 October 2013.  
8.  The ACCC reported that 252 complaints related to disclosure issues, which represents 19 per cent of the total number of overall complaints 
and inquiries in the period from July 2001 to June 2006. See G Matthews, Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of 
Conduct, Office of Small Business, Canberra, October 2006, p. 15, accessed 24 October 2013 and P Switzer, ‘Franchisees to back Rudd’s bully 
brief against predatory pricing‘, The Australian, 30 April 2008, p. 35, accessed 24 October 2013. 
9.  ‘Churning’ occurs where a franchisor sells a site or territory that is known to be unprofitable. When the franchisee inevitably fails, the 
franchisor reclaims the site for a nominal price and resells it to another franchisee who will also ultimately fail. See D Lynch, ‘Franchisee goes 
butter-side down’, Australian Financial Review, 23 April 2008, p. 16, accessed 24 October 2013. 
10.  LPO Group, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, undated, accessed 24 October 2013. 
11.  N Hoy, Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into the Franchising Code of Conduct, 
no. 8, undated, accessed 24 October 2013 and J Clout, ‘Franchisees get short shrift in disputes‘, Australian Financial Review, 18 November 
2008, p. 45, accessed 24 October 2013. 
12.  R Borradale, Submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Inquiry into the Franchising Code of 
Conduct, no. 16, undated, accessed 24 October 2013. 
13.  Information about the relevant inquiries in the period up to the end of 2008 are set out in P Pyburne, Current legal issues in franchising, 
Background note, Parliamentary Library, Canberra, November 2008, accessed 24 October 2013. 
14.  G Matthews , Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, Office of Small Business, Canberra, October 2006, 
accessed 24 October 2013. 
15.  Australian Government’s Response to the Review of the Disclosure Provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, Canberra, February 2007, 
accessed 24 October 2013. 
 
 
Franchising in Australia: striking a balance or tipping the balance? 6 
                                                             
 
In response to the Matthews review recommendations, the Code was amended with effect from 1 March 2008 
(2007 amendments).16 The object of the amendments was to increase the transparency, quality and timeliness 
of disclosure to existing and prospective franchisees.17 Announcing the changes, the Minister stated that: 
Prospective franchisees will have greater access to better information before signing on the dotted line. This will 
assist people to make the right decisions before investing large sums of their money in a business.18 
A summary of the changes is set out in Appendix 1 of this research paper. 
South Australia (2007) 
On 24 October 2007 the Economic and Finance Committee of the South Australian Parliament announced an 
inquiry (the SA inquiry) into the efficacy of the laws regulating the franchise relationship, with particular 
emphasis on the disclosure of information to potential franchisees and dispute resolution processes. 
The Final Report into Franchises by the Economic and Finance Committee (the SA report) was tabled in the 
South Australian Parliament on 6 May 2008.19  The key issues to emerge from the SA report were: 
• whether the disclosure provisions in the Code are sufficient to counteract ‘churning’ and  
• whether there is a duty for a franchisor to contract ‘in good faith’. 
Western Australia (2007) 
On 2 November 2007 the Small Business Minister for Western Australia, Margaret Quirk, announced an inquiry 
(the WA inquiry) into the operation of franchise businesses in that state. 
The report of the Inquiry into the Operation of Franchise Businesses in Western Australia (the WA report) was 
published in April 2008.20 The key issues which arose from the WA report were: 
• whether a franchisor could, or should, be compelled to enter into a new franchise agreement when the 
existing agreement ends and  
• whether a franchisee should be entitled to compensation for the ‘good will’ that has been created for the 
franchisor at the end of the agreement period.  
Federal Government: Opportunity not opportunism report (2008) 
The most significant of the inquiries to be held at the Commonwealth level was carried out by the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services (Corporations and Financial Services Committee).21 The 
report, entitled Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, made 
11 recommendations.22 Many of those recommendations addressed the common themes which had emerged in 
the earlier Commonwealth and state inquiries and which were repeated in evidence to the Corporations and 
Financial Services Committee, being: 
• whether the disclosure provisions in the Code were sufficient 
• whether a franchisor should be compelled to enter into a new agreement with a franchisee when the existing 
agreement ends  
• whether there should be an obligation to contract in good faith 
• whether a franchisor should pay ‘goodwill’ to a franchisee at the end of the franchise agreement in the 
absence of an option to enter into a new agreement   
16.  Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 1), accessed 24 October 2013. 
17.  Explanatory Statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes – Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 1), p. 1. 
18.  F Bailey (Minister for Small Business and Tourism), More transparency in franchising, media release, Canberra, 15 August 2007, accessed 
24 October 2013. 
19.  Economic and Finance Committee, Final Report: Franchises, Parliament of South Australia, Adelaide, 6 May 2008, accessed 24 October 2013.  
20.  Small Business Development Corporation, Inquiry into the Operation of Franchise Businesses in Western Australia: Report to the Western 
Australian Minister for Small Business, Perth, April 2008 p. ii, accessed 24 October 2013. 
21.  Details of the terms of reference, submissions to the Committee, transcripts of oral evidence and the final report are available on the Inquiry 
website, accessed 24 October 2013. 
22.  Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian 
franchising, Canberra, 2008, accessed 24 October 2013. 
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• whether the mediation arrangements set out in the Code were adequate and  
• whether the enforcement provisions of the CCA were sufficient to deal with a breach of the Code.  
A summary of the Committee’s recommendations is set out in Appendix 2 of this research paper.  
Expert panel (2010) 
The former Labor Government responded to the report of the Corporations and Financial Services Committee by 
appointing an expert panel to inquire into and report on the need to introduce measures into the Code to 
prevent specific behaviours that are inappropriate in a franchising arrangement.  In particular the panel was to 
consider:  
• imposition of unforeseen capital expenditure 
• unilateral contract variation by the franchisor 
• attribution of legal costs  
• confidentiality agreements and 
• franchisor-initiated changes to franchise agreements when a franchisee is trying to sell the business.23 
The expert panel report, entitled Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of 
Conduct (expert panel report) was submitted to the Government in February 2010.24 The Labor Government 
responded by further amending the Code (2010 amendments).25 A summary of the changes is set out in 
Appendix 3 of this research paper. Senator Sherry, the former Minister for Small Business, addressing the 
Franchise Council of Australia on 11 October 2011, stated: 
Our amendments to the Franchising Code of Conduct came into force in July last year, giving the sector greater 
protection, transparency and certainty. 
We stand firmly behind a national approach to franchising and we do not intend to review the Code of Conduct 
before 2013. This will allow sufficient time for the 2010 amendments to provide an informed evaluation.26 
Wein review (2013) 
Consistent with the statement by Senator Sherry, on 4 January 2013 the former Labor Government appointed 
Alan Wein to review the Code.27 In particular, his task was: 
• to review the efficacy of the 2007 and 2010 amendments to the Code and 
• to inquire into:  
– good faith in franchising  
– the rights of franchisees at the end of the term of their franchise agreements, including recognition for 
any contribution they have made to the building of the franchise and  
– the operation of the provisions of the CCA as they relate to enforcement of the Code.28 
During the course of the review 73 submissions were received.29 
The Wein report, released on 17 May 2013, made 18 recommendations and a number of sub-
recommendations.30 The Labor Government formally responded to the Wein review in July 2013, accepting 11 of 
23.  Commonwealth Government Response to the report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services—
Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, 16 November 2009, accessed 24 October 2013. 
24.  B Horrigan, D Lieberman and R Steinwall, Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of Conduct, Canberra, 
2010, accessed 24 October 2013. 
25.  Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2010 (No. 1) as well as the enactment of the Australian Consumer 
Law which is located in Schedule 2 to the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 
26.  N Sherry, Address to the 2011 National Franchising Convention, speech, 11 October 2011, accessed 24 October 2013.  
27.  B O’Connor (Minister for Small Business), Expert to review Franchising Code of Conduct, media release, 4 January 2013, accessed 24 October 
2013; Details of the inquiry, including the written submissions, final report and the government response to the report are available on the 
inquiry website. 
28.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. v. 
29.  The written submissions are available on the inquiry website. 
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the recommendations.31 In addition, the Government accepted two recommendations in part32 and eight in 
principle.33 A further two recommendations were noted.34  
Recurring key issues  
As already stated, inquiries into franchising have been dominated by recurring issues. These are: 
• the sufficiency of disclosure 
• conduct of the parties in all aspects of the franchise agreement, including prior to entering the agreement  
• franchisor insolvency 
• enforcement of the Code and the need for financial penalties when it is breached. 
The Wein review was no different. The remainder of this paper will consider the rationale for many of the 
recommendations of the Wein review, the latest in a long line of efforts to address issues which continue to 
trouble franchisees. 
The former Labor Government responded to the Wein review with a range of mooted legislative amendments. 
Despite reports that the proposed franchising reforms have bi-partisan support, the new Abbott Government 
has not signalled its intentions at the date of publication.35 
Key issue—disclosure  
Importance of disclosure 
It is the problem of information asymmetry between franchisors and franchisees that is the basis of the concerns 
about disclosure. 
The importance of accurate and up to date disclosure cannot be overstated. Its purpose is to give to a 
prospective franchisee, or an existing franchisee who is proposing to enter into, renew or extend the scope of a 
franchise agreement, information from the franchisor that will allow the person to make a reasonably informed 
decision about the franchise.36 In addition, it concedes the fact that there are often difficulties for franchisees 
attempting to carry out due diligence before entering into a franchising agreement as would occur with, say, the 
purchase of an existing business. As Jenny Buchan of the Australian School of Business explains: 
If the franchise is owned by a public company, there will be very little information that is specific to the wholly 
owned franchisor subsidiary in the published annual returns of the public company. 
While it is not difficult to conduct a search of a proprietary company, franchisors often operate different aspects of 
their businesses through more than one legal entity. The more entities there are, the more expensive and difficult it 
becomes to conduct a robust due diligence. If any of those entities, including the franchisor, is a trust, it is not 
possible to objectively verify the identity of the beneficiaries from the public records … 
The franchisee, faced with the high cost or the impossibility of conducting a thorough due diligence for itself, will 
decide to trust the franchisor’s information more or less on face value, or walk away.37 
Current disclosure requirements 
The Code is designed to ensure that franchisees are given information that is material to the running of the 
franchised business, and provide access to a fast and relatively inexpensive way to resolve any disputes. Broadly, it 
30.  G Gray (Minister for Small Business) and B Ripoll (Parliamentary Secretary for Small Business), Independent review of the $130 billion 
franchising sector released, joint media release, 17 May 2013, accessed 24 October 2013. 
31.  Forward looking franchise regulation: Commonwealth government response to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, July 2013, 
accessed 24 October 2013. Recommendations 2–5, 10, 12–13, 15(b), 15(c), 16 and 18. 
32.  Ibid., recommendations 8 and 9. 
33.  Ibid., recommendations, 1, 6(a), 6(b), 7, 11, 14, 15(a) and 17. 
34.  Ibid., recommendations 15(d) and 15(e). 
35.  G Gray (Minister for Small Business), Government welcomes bi-partisan support for franchising reform, media release, 25 July 2013, accessed 
24 October 2013. 
36.  Clause 6A of the Code. Importantly the Code does not contain a definition of the term ‘reasonably informed decision’. 
37.  J Buchan, ‘Challenges that franchisees of insolvent franchisors pose for liquidators’, Insolvency Law Journal, 16(1), 2008, pp. 29–30. 
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achieves this by requiring franchisors to disclose specific facts to franchisees and to follow set procedures in their 
dealings with franchisees.38 
Franchisors are required to create and maintain a disclosure document.39 The disclosure document must be 
consistent with the format set out in either Annexure 1 or Annexure 2 of the Code.40 It must contain information 
about a range of matters including, but not limited to: 
• current and past proceedings (including litigation and arbitration) against the franchisor and directors of the 
franchisor41 
• the franchise site or territory42 
• the supply of goods or services to and from a franchisee43 
• marketing or cooperative funds to which the franchisee may be required to contribute44 
• payments that will have to be made by the franchisee in relation to the franchise45 
• arrangements that apply at the end of the franchise agreement46 and  
• financial details of the franchisor.47  
The appropriate disclosure document and a copy of the Code must be provided to prospective franchisees and 
to franchisees proposing to renew or extend an existing franchise agreement at least 14 days before the 
prospective franchisee enters into, renews or extends the relevant franchise agreement or makes a 
non-refundable payment to the franchisor or an associate of the franchisor in connection with the proposed 
franchise agreement.48 
Disclosure of rights to compete with franchisee online  
The previous reviews of the Code, which are outlined above, recommended various changes to the disclosure 
provisions.49 This led to the passage of the 2007 amendments and the 2010 amendments.50 In accordance with 
its terms of reference, the Wein review considered whether those amendments to the disclosure provisions had 
been effective and whether further amendments were needed. 
The current disclosure provisions require disclosure of information about a franchisee’s right to operate in an 
exclusive or non-exclusive territory and whether the franchisor or other franchisees may operate a business that 
is substantially the same as the franchised business in the franchisee’s territory.51  
It is unclear, however, whether the franchisor is required to disclose its ability to compete with a franchisee 
online which would give it access to all physical territories.52 The Lottery Agents’ Association of Victoria 
38.  Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 20, accessed 24 October 2013. 
39.  Clause 6 of the Code. 
40.  Clause 7 of the Code. 
41.  Item 4 of Annexure 1 of the Code. 
42.  Item 8 of Annexure 1 of the Code. 
43.  Items 9 and 10 of Annexure 1 of the Code. 
44.  Item 12 of Annexure 1 of the Code. 
45.  Item 13 of Annexure 1 of the Code. 
46.  Item 17C of Annexure 1 of the Code. 
47.  Item 20 of Annexure 1 of the Code. 
48.  Clause 10 of the Code. 
49.  Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., pp. 9–14; Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in 
Australian franchising, op. cit., pp. xiii–xvii; Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., pp. 
xi–xiii. 
50.  Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 1), accessed 24 October 2013 and Trade Practices (Industry 
Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2010 (No. 1), accessed 24 October 2013. 
51.  Item 8, Annexure 1 of the Code. 
52.  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, undated, p. 8, 
accessed 24 October 2013.  
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expressed its concern that their franchisor’s move into online markets has had an adverse effect on them in their 
position as franchisees.53 
That view was endorsed by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in a submission to the 
review. The ACCC reported receiving 17 complaints from franchisees who were concerned that their franchisor 
was competing against them through its website.54  
Wein review recommendation 
The Wein review accepted there was a problem in relation to the potential for a franchisor or other franchisees 
to compete online with a franchisee, concluding that ‘the disclosure of online trading is important to ensure that 
the provisions of the Code keep pace with changes in technology and purchasing behaviours’.55 It recommended 
that the Code be amended to ensure that a franchisor is required to disclose the rights of the franchisor and 
franchisee to conduct and benefit from online sales, including any ability of the franchisor to conduct online 
sales.56 
Government response 
The Labor Government accepted this proposal with an additional requirement that the franchisor disclose its 
intention to conduct online sales and not just its ability to do so.57  
Comment 
This amendment will be a positive step for franchisors. It does not prevent a franchisor from conducting online 
sales in competition with the franchisee—provided that the proposed competition is disclosed. This will allow a 
prospective franchisee to make an informed decision about whether to become a part of that particular 
franchise.  
Disclosure of unforeseen capital expenditure 
Franchisees may be required, at times, to undertake capital expenditure to remain competitive and respond to 
market demands, franchise improvements (such as an increase in the range of products on offer) and regulatory 
changes. This may be by way of updated branding, shop fit-out or even site relocation.  Problems arise when the 
capital outlay is not outlined to the franchisee prior to entering into the agreement or where the term of the 
franchise is too short for the franchisee to recoup his or her investment.58 
In response to these concerns, the 2010 amendments to the Code included a requirement59 that a franchisor 
disclose whether the franchisee, through the franchise agreement, the operations manual (or equivalent), or any 
other means, could be obliged to undertake unforeseen significant capital expenditure that was not disclosed 
before the franchisee entered into the franchise agreement.60 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments 
According to one submitter to the Wein review: 
Providing details of “unforseen expenses” is in itself a complete nonsense. If the expenses are unforseen, how can a 
franchisor fill in this section of the Disclosure with any degree of accuracy? 
What has occurred practically is that some documents now contain a horrifically long list of possible expenses, the 
majority of which are highly unlikely to ever occur.61 
53.  Lottery Agents’ Association of Victoria, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, February 2013, accessed 24 October 
2013. 
54.  ACCC, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 8. 
55. Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 35. 
56.  Ibid., recommendation 3. 
57.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 8. 
58.  Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., pp. 53–54. 
59.  In item 13A of the disclosure document, at Annexure 1 of the Code. 
60.  Item 13A of Annexure 1 of the Code. 
61.  P Blain, Submission to the Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 7 February 2013, accessed 24 October 2013.  
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The Queensland Law Society also questioned the efficacy of the amendment stating that ‘the clause needs to be 
more specific about what is required to be disclosed and more specific about the amounts of the possible capital 
expenditure that will be undertaken’.62 
Wein report recommendation 
The Wein report considered that a requirement that a franchisee incur significant capital expenditure must not 
be ‘unreasonable’. That is, ‘there should be a business case for the imposition of the expenditure’.63 To that end, 
it recommended that the Code be amended to prohibit franchisors from imposing unreasonable significant 
unforeseen capital expenditure. The Wein review recommended that the terms ‘unreasonable’ and ‘significant’ 
should be defined. In essence, a franchisor requiring franchisees to incur significant capital expenditure, the 
nature and extent of which was not set out in the relevant disclosure document, would have to be able to 
demonstrate a business case for capital investment in the franchised business.64 
Government response 
This recommendation was accepted in principle by the former Labor Government—due to the difficulty in 
defining the relevant terms. Acknowledging that item 13A of the disclosure document has not been as effective 
in practice as was intended, the former Labor Government stated that it would remove the requirement to 
disclose unforeseen capital expenditure in item 13A and include some common examples in the generic risk 
statement.65 
Comment 
From the franchisee perspective, this response fails to address the underlying concern that they may be 
required, during the life of the franchise agreement, to make significant capital expenditure that they did not 
foresee and was not disclosed in a meaningful way. This is the harm that item 13A was intended to address. 
From the franchisor perspective, the decision to remove item 13A supports the franchisor position that there 
can be valid reasons for unforeseen capital expenditure.  
The introduction of unforeseen refurbishments or other costs may introduce significant financial difficulties for 
franchisees, particularly if costs are introduced close to the end of the franchise term. However, in the case of 
rebranding, a franchisor needs to consider all of its franchisees as well as the image of the franchise as a whole. As 
such, the franchisor may need to ensure refurbishments were introduced into all of its franchised outlets within a 
defined timeframe … individual franchise agreements are likely to have different start and finish dates, therefore 
some franchisees could face unforeseen refurbishment costs at the end of their term, others could face these costs 
at the beginning of the term and others could face the costs in the middle of the term. It is also important to 
consider that while shop re-fits or the introduction of new policies may require substantial capital outlays from 
franchisees, a refurbished shop may attract additional customers, which could be beneficial to both individual 
franchisees and the franchise as a whole.66 
According to the expert panel there was insufficient evidence about the prevalence of inappropriate conduct in 
this area. That being the case, ‘a general prohibition of the behaviour may constrain franchisors from making 
valid commercial decisions, and may not be a proportional response to a potentially confined problem’.67 
The Wein review seems to have tried to find a middle ground. It did not recommend a prohibition of the 
behaviour. Instead the Wein review advocated for a reasonableness test in relation to undisclosed capital 
outlays. What remains though, are questions about who decides what is reasonable and what is not. Presumably 
these are matters for the courts. In that case, the recommendation delivers neither an easy, or inexpensive, 
solution to the problem nor certainty for either party to a franchise agreement. 
62.  Queensland Law Society, Submission to the Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 20 February 2013, accessed 24 October 2013. 
63.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 52. 
64.  Ibid., recommendation 7, p. 53. 
65.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., pp. 11–12. 
66.  Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 56. 
67.  Ibid., p. 59. 
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Disclosure about marketing funds 
Most franchise agreements require that the franchisee contribute either a fixed amount or a percentage of their 
turnover to a marketing fund. Most franchise agreements also state that the fund will be used at the discretion 
of the franchisor and the franchisor does not need to spend a certain amount, or for that matter any amount, of 
the money contributed in the franchisee’s area.68 
As early as 2006, the Matthews review noted concerns from franchisees about the operation and management 
of marketing and other co-operative funds. The concerns related to the lack of transparency in the management 
and application of such funds and the fate of the franchisees’ contributions in the event of franchisor failure.69  
In its submission to the Wein review, the ACCC stated that it had received 49 complaints in the last five years 
about how franchisors are spending marketing funds.70 The problems with marketing funds have been described 
as follows:  
Some franchisors spend the money in areas which the franchisees do not believe is strictly marketing. For example: 
a franchise system which uses the money for the registration and maintenance of existing or new trade marks.  
… Others want to spend the money attending franchise expos because they believe that is marketing of the system. 
Some others want to spend the money on conferences.  
Those uses of funds are not what would be thought of by any reasonable franchisee as being what was 
contemplated by the franchisee when they were originally told they were expected to contribute to a fund.71  
Limitations of the Code 
Clause 17 of the Code provides that franchisors are required to provide relevant audited financial statements 
within five months of the end of the financial year to franchisees who make payments into marketing or other 
co-operative funds.72 However, a franchisor does not have to provide a statement if 75 per cent of the 
franchisor’s franchisees who contribute to the fund, have voted to agree that the franchisor does not have to do 
so. That agreement remains in force for three years at the end of which time, the franchisees must vote again. 
A number of problems arise in relation to marketing funds due to deficiencies in the Code. 
First, there is no requirement in clause 17 to particularise the expenditure of monies in the fund. In that case, it 
is impossible for franchisees to determine what advertising activities were undertaken and where they were 
undertaken during the relevant financial year. This makes it extremely difficult for a franchisee to determine 
whether the monies were spent appropriately. If a franchisee disagrees with the way that the monies were 
expended, he or she may have no recourse but to accept the franchisor’s explanation, depending on the drafting 
of the franchise agreement. 
Second, there is no requirement in clause 17 that monies which are paid to a marketing fund by franchisees be 
kept by the franchisor in a separate fund. Rather, they may be mixed with other royalty and fee payments in a 
general fund operated by the franchisor. This makes the auditing of the marketing fund more complex and 
expensive.  
Third, the Code does not require that monies levied on franchisees for marketing and advertising are actually 
spent. 
Fourth, whilst subclause 17(4) of the Code provides that monies paid into a marketing fund must be used to pay 
for the reasonable costs of administering and auditing the fund, the Code does not limit that amount or provide 
a method for its calculation.  
68.  Bywaters Timms Lawyers, Franchise marketing and other cooperative funds, accessed 24 October 2013. 
69.  Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 35. 
70.  ACCC, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 3. 
71.  Franchise marketing and other cooperative funds, op. cit.   
72.  Paragraphs 17(1)(a) and (b) provide that the franchisor must within 4 months after the end of the last financial year, prepare an annual 
financial statement detailing all of the fund’s receipts and expenses for the last financial year and have the statement audited by a registered 
company auditor. Paragraph 17(1)(c) requires the franchisor to give a copy of the statement and auditor’s report to the franchisees within 30 
days. 
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Effectiveness of earlier amendments 
The Matthews review noted that, at that time, franchisors had an option to seek approval from 75 per cent of 
their franchisees to avoid the requirement to have marketing funds audited. The Matthews review 
recommended that the option be removed.73 The 2007 amendments did not put this recommendation into 
effect. (That is, subclause 17(2) was not deleted). However, under the 2007 amendment the decision to choose 
whether annual audits are to be undertaken is to be renewed every three years. 
Wein review recommendation—use of marketing funds 
According to the Wein review those ‘amendments to the Code do not appear to have gone far enough to 
prevent disputation and potential, or perceived, misuse of marketing and advertising funds’.74 Consequently, the 
Wein review recommended that a number of amendments be made to the Code in relation to the 
administration of marketing funds. 
First, the marketing and advertising fund should only be used for expenses which are clearly disclosed to 
franchisees by way of the disclosure document, and which are legitimate marketing and advertising expenses.75  
Government response 
The former Labor Government accepted this recommendation.76 
Comments 
Whilst this will be a welcome statement of principle for franchisees, there is no detail about what will be 
considered a ‘legitimate’ expense. Depending on how broadly that term is defined, it may be that some 
franchisees will remain frustrated by the manner in which marketing funds are expended. At the same time, 
some franchisors may consider that it is not appropriate for the Government to interfere in what are essentially 
commercial decisions for the benefit of the franchise as a whole. 
Wein review recommendation—accounting for marketing funds 
Second, it was recommended that a franchisor should separately account for marketing and advertising costs.77 
This is a direct response to a call by submitters to the Wein review that ‘it would be prudent for the marketing or 
other cooperative fund [to] be explicitly required to be held in trust for franchisees instead of being incorporated 
into the franchisor’s general revenue’.78  
In addition, the Wein review recommended that contributions to marketing funds from individual franchisees 
should be held on trust for franchisees generally, with the franchisor to have wide discretion as to how to 
expend the funds, subject to an annual independent audit.79  
Government response 
The former Labor Government was silent about whether it would require marketing and advertising costs to be 
placed into a separate account, stating only that it would take steps to make the administration of those funds 
more transparent. 
However it stated that it would ‘not amend the Code to require that marketing and advertising funds are to be 
treated as trust funds or held in a trust account’.80 
Comments 
The requirement that marketing funds should be placed in a trust account is not a new idea. As early as 2006, 
submitters to the Matthews review suggested that this should occur. However the Matthews review rejected 
the suggestion.81 The  Labor Government then concurred with that position. It rejected the Wein review 
73.  Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., recommendation 6, p. 10. 
74.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 57. 
75.  Ibid., recommendation 8d. 
76.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 12. 
77.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., recommendation 8a. 
78.  J Buchan, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 13 February 2013, p. 4, accessed 24 October 2013. 
79.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., recommendations 8b and 8e. 
80. Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 12. 
81.  Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 35. 
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recommendation on the grounds that imposing such a requirement could result in unintended tax consequences 
and ‘may increase the compliance costs and risks in a way that is disproportionate to the benefit that a trust 
fund arrangement would confer on franchisees’.82 
From a franchisee perspective, if marketing or other co-operative funds were to be treated as trust funds or held 
in a trust account the franchisee ‘can then have a chance of recouping the money if an administrator is 
appointed to the franchisor. This would provide better ultimate protection than an audit and may cost the 
franchisor less’.83 If the recommendation were accepted, a fiduciary relationship would be established between 
the franchisor and franchisee in relation to those monies.84 In that case, the franchisor would have a duty not to 
retain the benefit of the funds in the marketing account for him or herself. This would go some way to appeasing 
those franchisees who consider that the franchisor has not spent marketing funds appropriately—in particular 
where the relevant funds were not spent at all. 
From the franchisor perspective requiring these funds to be placed in a trust account may be considered to 
create an unwelcome increase in the cost of administering the franchise business. 
The power imbalance between a franchisor and its franchisees is apparent in the operation of clause 17 of the 
Code. The Wein review recommendation, if accepted in total, would have imposed onerous duties on 
franchisors with respect to marketing and advertising funds. However, the recommendation as accepted by the 
Government does not appear to fully address the gaps in clause 17 of the Code which impact significantly on 
franchisees as outlined above.  
Disclosure of risk before entering into an agreement 
In its original form, the Code required that a statement be set out on the first page of the disclosure document 
which indicated, amongst other things, that entering into a franchise agreement is ‘a serious undertaking’ and 
that the franchise agreement would be legally binding once it was signed.85 
The adequacy of the statement was questioned in 2006 by the Matthews review, which noted that some of the 
problems which had been revealed during the review ‘may have been avoided if the prospective franchisee had 
a clearer understanding of the significant risks that were involved in becoming a franchisee’.86 
The matter was raised again in submissions to the Corporations and Financial Services Committee, which 
recommended that the Code be amended to require that disclosure documents have a ‘clear statement by 
franchisors of the liabilities and consequences applying to franchisees in the event of franchisee failure’.87 The 
2010 amendments included such a statement.88 The risk statement in its current form is set out in Appendix 4. 
The expert panel took the matter a little further, recommending that a short, simple, ‘plain English’ document be 
provided to prospective franchisees earlier in the process of entering a franchise agreement ‘to ensure the 
message is conveyed prior to the franchisee becoming emotionally invested in the particular franchise 
opportunity’.89 The document, as proposed by the expert panel, ‘would emphasise to prospective franchisees 
the key costs, benefits and risks of the franchise system, while leaving more complete disclosure to the formal 
disclosure documents already required’.90  
Wein review recommendation 
The Wein review considered that ‘the arguments in favour of a short summary of key risks and matters a 
prospective franchisee should be aware of when going into franchising are persuasive’.91 The Wein review 
recommended that the Code be amended to require that a short generic statement, setting out the key risks and 
82. Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 12. 
83.  J Buchan, Submission to the Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 4. 
84.  M Evans, Outline of equity and trusts, Butterworths, Australia, 1988, paragraph 509. The gist of any fiduciary relationship is that equity will 
not allow the fiduciary to enter into any engagements in which he has, or could have, a personal interest conflicting with that of his principal; 
nor will it allow him to retain any benefit or gain obtained, or received, by reason of his fiduciary position or through some opportunity or 
knowledge resulting from it. 
85. Item 1 of Annexure A of the Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulations 1998 (as made), accessed 4 October 2013. 
86.  Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 33. 
87.  Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, op. cit., p. 46. 
88.  Item 1.1(e) of the disclosure document. 
89.  Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 40. p. 79.  
90.  Ibid. 
91.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 40. 
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other matters of which a prospective franchisee should be aware, and be provided at the first point of contact 
with the franchisee.92 
Government response 
The former Labor Government accepted the recommendation and stated its intention to develop the final form 
of the document in consultation with key stakeholders. The provision of the risk statement will be required only 
in respect of the first grant of a franchise, including to an incoming party as part of a transfer or novation.93 This 
means that franchisees that are renewing, extending, or extending the scope of, their franchise agreement will 
not need to be provided with the risk statement.94 Clearly, as that group of franchisees already has a 
relationship with the franchisor, the need for a low level, simple risk statement is less pressing. 
Comment—reading and understanding the disclosure document 
According to the ACCC: 
There is anecdotal evidence (and complaint data) suggesting that many franchisees do not read, or at least do not 
understand, the disclosure document they receive before they enter into a franchise agreement. This is usually 
attributed to the length and complexity of most disclosure documents.95 
The provision of the sort of risk statement which has been mooted does not address the concern that a potential 
franchisee may not make a rigorous assessment of the contents of the disclosure document. At its worst, the 
potential franchisee may interpret the risk statement as an assurance that the franchise business is low risk. 
In addition, despite its recommendation, the Wein review acknowledged the lack of clarity around what the 
proposed risk statement would contain and the extent to which it would depart from the requirements of the 
existing item 1 of Annexure 1 to the Code.96 The ACCC suggests that such a document could set out those 
elements of a franchising arrangement that appear to be most misunderstood by franchisees such as rights to 
renewal, what happens if the agreement is not renewed, the franchisor’s right to terminate the agreement for 
breach by the franchisee, and what happens if the franchisor fails—even though that information is already 
contained in the disclosure document.97  
Key issue—franchisor failure  
Nature of the problem 
Depending on many variables, such as the strength of the franchisor’s brand, the size of the franchisee’s 
investment, the amount of money the franchisee has borrowed, the particular franchise model adhered to, the 
amount of time remaining on the franchise and the location of franchisees’ businesses, the impact of the 
franchisor’s failure on its franchisees ranges from slight to catastrophic.98 
Clause 23 of the Code provides that a franchisor may terminate a franchisee under specified circumstances. 
However, the Code does not contain an equivalent right for a franchisee to exit the contract in the event of 
franchisor failure.  
The operation of the Code must be considered in the context of the Corporations Act 2001.99 When a business 
fails, the Corporations Act operates to allow for the orderly winding up and deregistration of the insolvent 
company. Generally the liquidator is concerned with exercising control of as much property as is available that 
can then be realised for the benefit of creditors.100 However, in some cases liquidators do not wish to retain 
92.  Ibid., recommendation 5. 
93.  Under clause 3 of the Code, novation in relation to a franchise means the termination of the franchise and entry into a new franchise with a 
proposed transferee on the same terms as the terminated franchise. Transfer, under clause 3 of the Code, includes an arrangement in which 
the franchise is granted, transferred or sold. 
94.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., pp. 9–10. 
95.  ACCC, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 7. 
96.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 40. 
97.  ACCC, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 8. 
98.  J Buchan, ‘Consumer protection for franchisees of failed franchisors: is there a need for statutory intervention?’, Queensland University of 
Technology Law and Justice Journal, 9(2), 2009, pp. 232–250 at p. 232. 
99.  Corporations Act 2001, accessed 24 October 2013. 
100.  P Switzer, ‘Beaten to a pulp: franchise in limbo‘, The Australian, 21 March 2006, p. 23, accessed 24 October 2013. 
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property because it is too onerous, worth little or is unsaleable. In those circumstances, liquidators will wish to 
get rid of the property in order to avoid the responsibilities and costs in relation to it and to avoid prolonging of 
the administration.101 A liquidator may do this by an action of disclaimer under section 568 of the Corporations 
Act. 
Once a liquidator has been appointed for a franchisor, the individual agreements between the franchisor and its 
franchisees become either an asset or a liability in the franchisor’s insolvency.102 As the franchisor’s insolvency 
does not automatically bring the franchise agreements to an end, it is for the liquidator to decide whether to 
exercise his or her right to disclaim onerous assets—including, but not limited to, a lease of the premises a 
franchisee trades from, an agreement with a supplier or the franchise agreement itself.103 
The Corporations and Financial Services Committee sets out the problem of franchisor failure as follows: 
… though section 18(2)(g) of the Code requires the franchisor to give written notice to a franchisee or prospective 
franchisee when the franchisor becomes an externally administered body corporate, the appointment of an 
administrator for a franchise system does not of itself terminate or constitute repudiation of the agreement. When 
companies fail, secured creditors are given priority over remaining assets, followed by unsecured creditors, 
shareholders and then other parties. When a franchisor fails, a franchisee may be terminated with little prospect of 
compensation or ability to continue trading, yet may still be required to pay franchise fees, including royalty 
payments, to the liquidator until the franchisor is wound up—despite no longer receiving support or services from 
the franchisor.104 
The problem is compounded by the lack of contractual remedies available to the franchisees of an insolvent 
franchisor. Franchisees cannot sue an insolvent franchisor in contract for the following reasons: 
• the franchisor has not breached the franchise agreement by becoming insolvent as the agreement is 
invariably silent on the issue 
• the contractual remedy of an award of damages is useless in circumstances where the franchisor has no 
assets 
• the powers given to administrators and liquidators under the Corporations Act trump contract law rights and  
• no one except a liquidator can initiate proceedings against a party in administration without the consent of 
the court—a step which would be prohibitively expensive for a franchisee.105 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments 
The Corporations and Financial Services Committee recommended that ‘the Government explore avenues to 
better balance the rights and liabilities of involved parties in the event of franchisor failure’.106 As already stated, 
a warning about the risk to the franchisee of franchisor failure was included in the generic risk statement until 
the 2010 amendments came into effect (see Appendix 4).  
In accordance with its terms of reference, the Wein review canvassed opinions about whether the amendment 
had been effective. Jenny Buchan of the University of New South Wales submitted that: 
This notice is insufficient to warn franchisees about the specific risk they as a franchisee potentially face if their 
franchisor fails. Every franchise network is structured differently so there are numerous possible scenarios when 
one party becomes insolvent. It is within the franchisor’s power to set out the basic likely consequences … The 
current wording does not go far enough to set out in black and white what the consequences of insolvency may 
be.107 
101.  M Murray and J Harris, Keay’s insolvency: personal and corporate law and practice, seventh edition, Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2011, pp. 
437–438. 
102.  J Buchan, Franchisees as consumers: benchmarks, perspectives and consequences, Springer, New York, p. 114. 
103.  Ibid.  
104.  Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, op. cit., p. 69. 
105.  J Buchan, Submission, op. cit., p. 14, accessed 24 October 2013. 
106.  Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, op. cit., p. 69. 
107.  J Buchan, Submission, op. cit., p. 7, accessed 24 October 2013. 
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Wein recommendation 
The Wein review noted that ‘in general, submissions to the review felt that the government’s 2010 amendment 
to the Code did little to address the problem of franchisor failure’.108 However, it also acknowledged that it had 
received ‘no submissions from franchisees (or former franchisees) who stated they had participated in a 
franchisor’s business which subsequently went into insolvency’.109 That being the case, it is unclear how many 
franchisees have been affected by franchisor failure.110 
Nevertheless, the Wein review recommended, in recognition that the problem of franchisor failure is a ‘serious 
and ongoing one’, further amendment of the Code to ‘provide franchisees with more certainty regarding the 
procedure and timing of the options they will be faced with if the franchisor fails’.111 The proposed amendment 
has two parts: 
• provide franchisees and franchisors with a right to terminate the franchise agreement in the event that any 
administrator of the other party does not turn the business around, or a new buyer is not found for the 
franchise system, within a reasonable time (recommendation 6a) and  
• ensure the franchisees can be made unsecured creditors of the franchisor by notionally apportioning the 
franchise fee across the term of the franchise agreement, so that any amount referrable to the unexpired 
portion of the franchise agreement would become a debt in the event the franchise agreement ended due to 
the franchisor’s failure (recommendation 6b). 
Government response 
Both parts of the recommendation were accepted in principle by the former Government, which stated that it 
would undertake further consultation with the industry and with relevant experts on the implications of the 
recommendation.112  
Comment—franchisee’s right to terminate 
There are different types of ‘administration’—insolvency, receiver management, voluntary administration, or 
personal bankruptcy; the nature of the administration of the franchisor will have a bearing on how 
recommendation 6a would operate. The Wein review acknowledged that appointed insolvency officials may 
have different powers and obligations.113 This is one of the reasons that the Government needs to consult 
further on the recommendation. 
From a franchisee perspective, allowing the franchisee to terminate the franchise agreement relieves him, or 
her, of the ongoing obligation to pay fees for services and products which the franchisor may no longer be 
delivering and to make ongoing royalty payments. 
However, it is not a ‘cure all’ measure for franchisees. It will not release the franchisee from third party 
obligations. For example, a franchisee may still have to meet lease payments for premises and equipment which 
were used in the franchise business. In that case, the termination of the franchise agreement may well be an act 
that crystallises the franchisee’s own business debts, thereby sending him, or her, inadvertently into bankruptcy 
or insolvency. 
The far-reaching effects on franchisees arising from franchisor failure are described as follows: 
Although franchisees may be creditors, that status does not fully recognise the extent of their investment in the 
franchise, or their losses when the franchisor fails. In fact, if a liquidator is appointed to a franchisor, the franchisee 
may experience outcomes it had not contemplated by way of the liquidation crystallising not only the claims of the 
franchisee but also the liabilities the franchisor required the franchisee to take on to third parties.114 
108.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 44. 
109.  Ibid., p. 46. 
110.  Ibid., p. 44. 
111.  Ibid, p. 47. 
112.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., pp. 10–11. 
113.  Ibid., p. 43. 
114.  J Buchan, Franchisees as consumers: benchmarks, perspectives and consequences, op. cit., p. 115. 
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From a franchisor’s perspective, the effect of recommendation 6a may be interpreted as an attempt to thwart 
the efforts of the administrator or liquidator to sell the franchise business as a going concern.115 In addition, the 
Wein review conceded that the ability of franchisors to attract and retain capital and credit could be affected by 
changes which significantly altered the right of the parties on the insolvency of a franchisor, such as an 
immediate right for the franchisee to terminate.116 Hence the recommendation that the franchisee’s right to 
terminate should only arise ‘within a reasonable time’ such as 60 days. 
Comment—right to be a creditor 
A liquidator is responsible for collecting the assets of the failed franchisor and distributing them to the creditors. 
Debts are paid in the order stipulated in the Corporations Act.117 If the funds are insufficient to meet all the 
debts in full, they are paid proportionately.118 In addition, a liquidator may hold a creditors’ meeting (or 
meetings) to advise the creditors of the likelihood of a return, the progress of the winding up and to allow the 
creditors’ wishes to be taken into account.119  
Under recommendation 6b, a franchisee of a failed franchisor becomes an unsecured creditor in any winding up. 
This will give franchisees the right to attend a creditors’ meeting. However the notional debt created by 
recommendation 6b is not a priority debt. As unsecured creditors, franchisees’ rights to distribution of monies 
come after the franchisor’s employees and secured creditors in terms of priority. That being the case, many 
franchisees may see any amendment in response to this recommendation as not delivering any concrete benefit 
to them. 
Comment—whether there is a need to reform insolvency laws 
The question arises whether insolvency and bankruptcy law in Australia ‘simply do not provide viable solutions 
for franchisees and failed franchisors’.120 The Wein review cautioned against tipping the balance of the franchise 
relationship in the event of insolvency stating: 
While the result for franchisors and franchisees in the context of insolvency will almost always be a negative one, 
that does not necessarily mean there is a problem with the insolvency regime. Rather, it is a consequence of 
insolvency itself.121 
No policy rationale has been put forward which would justify making franchisees a special case in the insolvency 
regime at this time. However, the commercial implications of the Personal Property Securities Act 2009 on the 
franchise sector are yet to be assessed.122 It has been reported that: 
Franchisors are amending their agreements, in light of the new legislation, to provide the franchisor with the power 
to register their security interests against the franchisee and to prohibit the franchisee from giving security interests 
to third parties without the franchisor’s consent. In addition [Personal Property Securities Act] … provides specific 
‘notice’ requirements when franchisors want to take back possession of goods on termination.123   
Greater franchisee education would appear to be warranted. This would include ‘not just the insolvency of the 
franchisor but also entities that may be relevant to the network such as the owner of [the intellectual property 
in the brand], any leasing company and any companies that supply goods or services to the network that may be 
related to the franchisor or to its owners’.124  
115.  E Greenblat, ‘Administrators take rebel booksellers to court’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 8 April 2011, accessed 24 October 2013; 
C Zappone, ‘Booksellers’ woes worsen as franchisees seek to defect’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 5 April 2011, accessed 24 October 2013; 
D Sutherland, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 14 February 2013, p. 7, accessed 24 October 2013.  
116.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 47. 
117.  Corporations Act 2001, section 556. 
118.  Corporations Act 2001, section 555. 
119.  Corporations Act 2001, section 547. 
120.  Ibid, p. 33. 
121.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 48. 
122.  Personal Property Securities Act 2009, accessed 24 October 2013. 
123.  M Kojok, Legal issues in franchising, Baybridge Lawyers website, 24 May 2013, accessed 24 October 2013. 
124.  D Sutherland, op. cit., p. 6, accessed 24 October 2013. 
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Key issue—good faith in franchising 
Calls for a requirement that there be a duty of good faith in franchising have typically accompanied allegations of 
opportunistic conduct by franchisors who are perceived to be taking advantage of the imbalance of bargaining 
power between franchisors and franchisees.125 
The Wein review noted that there had been repeated calls over time for the introduction into the Code of an 
express duty to act in good faith.126 In particular, the Corporations and Financial Services Committee expressed 
its concern at the continuing absence of an explicit overarching standard of conduct for parties entering into a 
franchising agreement.127 The Corporations and Financial Services Committee accepted that there is an inherent 
and necessary imbalance of power in franchise agreements in favour of the franchisor. Unfortunately, abuse of 
the power could lead to a range of opportunistic conduct including ‘encroachment, kickbacks, churning, 
non-renewal, transfer, termination at will and unreasonable unilateral variations to the agreement’.128 As a 
result, the Corporations and Financial Services Committee gave lengthy consideration to the question of 
whether a duty to act in good faith should be inserted into the Code—and decided that it should.129 
The duty of good faith 
In broad terms the duty of good faith connotes compliance with honest standards of conduct which are 
reasonable, having regard to the interests of the parties.130   
There is disagreement about whether Australian law has unequivocally accepted a duty of good faith in the 
performance and enforcement of contracts generally. 
In relation to franchises, there is legal authority for the view that a duty of good faith can be implied.  The NSW 
Supreme Court said in a 2007 case that the duty requires the franchisor to act: 
• reasonably and honestly 
• objectively 
• without simply relying on information provided by third parties or ‘wilfully shutting (one’s) eyes’ or refraining 
from making inquiries, but exercising the degree of ‘caution and diligence to be expected of an honest person 
of ordinary prudence’ 
• without some ulterior motive 
• with recognition and regard to the legitimate interests of both parties in the enjoyment of the fruits of the 
contract, and 
• to avoid action rendering the plaintiff’s interests under the agreement ‘nugatory, worthless, or … seriously 
undermined’.131 
However, the High Court has not reached a binding conclusion on the issue. 
In Australia, some courts have accepted, to some degree, the implication of obligations of good faith in contractual 
dealings.  For instance, it has been suggested that good faith embraces three notions: an obligation on the parties 
to cooperate in achieving their contractual objects, compliance with honest standards of conduct and compliance 
with standards of conduct which are reasonable having regard to the interests of the parties. However, uniform 
acceptance and understanding of concepts, content and implications of good faith obligations has not emerged in 
the Australian jurisdictions.132   
Just as some Australian courts have tried to define what conduct satisfies the duty of good faith, others have 
expressed views about the limits of the duty. The NSW Court of Appeal had this to say: 
125.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 63. 
126.  Ibid., pp. 64–66. 
127.  Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, op. cit., p. 101. 
128.  Ibid. 
129.  Ibid., recommendation 8, p. 115. 
130.  T Hanna, ‘Court of Appeal rejects tortious duty of good faith’, Law Society Journal, 45(10), November 2007, pp. 78-79, accessed 24 October 
2013.  
131.  J F Keir Pty Ltd v Priority Management Systems Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2007] NSWSC 789, (24 July 2007), accessed 24 October 
2013. This position was reiterated in AMC Commercial Cleaning (NSW) Pty Ltd v Coade [2010] NSWSC 832, accessed 24 October 2013.  
132.  Review of the disclosure provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 46.  
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… it was appropriate to imply into the Agreement an obligation that the parties would act in good faith towards 
each other. That is consistent with the approach adopted in a number of decisions of this court … However, these 
decisions have emphasised that the obligation does not require a party to act in the interests of the other party or 
subordinate its own legitimate interests to those of the other party, although it does require it to have due regard 
to the rights and interests of the other party. 133 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments 
Despite the recommendations of the Corporations and Financial Services Committee, the Government did not 
insert a duty of good faith into the Code in the terms that had been suggested. The Regulatory Impact Statement 
for the 2010 amendments explains the arguments for and against the imposition of the duty as follows: 
On one hand, proponents of the need for a reference to good faith within the Franchising Code argue that it could 
serve as an aspirational goal for franchise sector participants, would recognise the interdependent nature of the 
franchising relationship and would recognise a principle which is being tested in the Courts. In contrast … there is 
wide disagreement in both the Courts and academia as to the suitability and applicability of the good faith principle 
in commercial arrangements. Furthermore … there is a lack of a universally accepted specific definition of good faith 
and there is wide disagreement on the implications of inserting a reference to good faith within the Franchising 
Code.134 
As a compromise, clause 23A was inserted into the Code by the 2010 amendments to provide that nothing in the 
Code limits any obligation imposed by the common law, applicable in a state or territory, on the parties to a 
franchising agreement to act in good faith. According to the relevant explanatory statement ‘the insertion of the 
new clause 23A within the Code preserves and recognises any developments in the case law on the concept of 
good faith’.135  
According to the Wein review, the key concerns with clause 23A are that: 
• it does not necessarily prevent arguments that there is no duty to act in good faith 
• it can be contracted out of by the parties 
• it is not a duty under the Code and is therefore not enforceable by the ACCC and  
• because it is not defined, the nature of any obligation to act in good faith presents a ‘lawyers picnic’ as parties have to 
get legal advice about what it means.136 
Wein review recommendation 
The Wein report notes that, when the inclusion of a duty of good faith was first mooted: 
The government was concerned that uncertainty would be increased by an express statement of the requirement in 
the Code, since neither franchisors nor franchisees would be certain of the occurrence of a breach. Further, in any 
given situation the franchisor’s perspective on the scope of the concept may differ from that of the franchisee.137  
Those comments remain valid. One submitter stated: 
Good faith is a term with capacity to mislead franchisees who would believe that it means what it says: good 
faith. It is impossible for franchisors and franchisees to approach all issues in good faith as their relationship is 
replete with conflicts of interest. … It is optimistic to think it would be possible to monitor whether good faith 
has been adhered to in a franchise. … I would delete Clause 23A that was inserted in 2010 as I believe it has 
the potential to delude the parties into a sense of unachievable entitlement.138 
Unsurprisingly, most of the submissions to the Wein review commented on the issue, displaying the same 
polarity of views as were expressed to previous inquiries. However, according to the Wein review, ‘more 
133.  Cordon Investments Pty Ltd v Lesdor Properties Pty Ltd, [2012] NSWCA 184, accessed 24 October 2013.  
134.  Regulatory impact statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2010 (No. 1), p. 53, accessed 
24 October 2013. 
135.  Explanatory statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2010 (No. 1), p. 5, accessed 24 October 2013. 
136.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 67. 
137.  Ibid., p. 63. 
138.  J Buchan, Submission, op. cit., pp. 7–8. 
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submissions supported an obligation to act in good faith than did not support such an obligation’.139 That being 
the case the Wein review recommended that the Code be amended to include an express obligation to act in 
good faith.140 The recommended application of the duty of good faith is extremely broad. It is to: 
• extend to the negotiation of a franchise agreement, the performance of a franchise agreement, the 
performance of obligations under the Code, and the resolution of any disputes between the parties141 
• apply to both the franchisor and the franchisee or prospective franchisee and the agents of these parties142 
and  
• not be able to be limited or excluded by any provision of the franchise agreement.143 
Government response 
The former Labor Government’s response to the recommendation was lukewarm. Whilst it stated that it 
accepted the recommendation, it also noted its concerns about: 
• the application of the duty—that is, whether it should apply to all aspects of the franchise agreement, 
including negotiations of the agreement—and whether the unwritten law of good faith should be extended 
to the performance of all obligations of the Code 
• the nature of the duty and  
• the extension of the duty to agents which ‘may result in the Code regulating parties who it was not intended 
to regulate’.144  
Comment—whether a list of behaviours is of assistance 
Recommendation 9b is that the unwritten law relating to good faith should be incorporated into the Code in a 
manner similar to that which was used to incorporate the unwritten law related to unconscionable conduct into 
the Australian Consumer Law.145 The Wein review suggests that the following conduct may be interpreted as 
conduct which is not in good faith: 
• the franchisor imposing unsafe practices for workers or customers 
• forcing franchisees to promote the franchisor’s products in a way that diminishes the sale of other products 
sold by the franchisee 
• general mismanagement and waste of marketing funds 
• threatening the franchisee with breach, non-renewal, or competition from a new operator if certain 
conditions are not met 
• forcing inventory upon the franchisee and requiring it to sell products with unsustainable margins 
• forcing the franchisee to buy overpriced goods from the franchisor 
• cost shifting to the franchisee or not maintaining the franchisee’s margin and  
• franchisees using social media to post negative comments about their franchisor or their dispute with their 
franchisor.146  
The danger in inserting an express obligation to act in good faith as recommended is that aggrieved franchisees 
may interpret the obligation differently from the courts. This is even more so, in the context of proposed 
139.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 67. 
140.  Ibid., recommendation 9, p. 82. 
141.  Ibid., Recommendation 9a. 
142.  Ibid., Recommendation 9c. 
143.  Ibid., Recommendation 9d. 
144.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 13. 
145.  That is, clauses 20 and 21 of the Australian Consumer Law prohibit unconscionable conduct. Clause 22 of the Australian Consumer Law lists a 
range of circumstances to which the Court may have regard in deciding whether impugned conduct is ‘unconscionable’ for the purposes of 
the CCA. 
146.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., pp. 70–71. 
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amendments to the Code to impose pecuniary penalties for a breach of the Code.147 Recommendation 9f 
specifically responds to the possibility that franchisees might interpret the duty more broadly than intended.  
Importantly, recommendation 9c provides that the duty will apply to both the franchisor and the franchisee. As 
one submitter stated: 
Regrettably, I have seen many instances of franchisees behaving poorly in the lead up to mediations, including the 
posting of denigrating comments on internet blogs and social media and discussing the subject matter of their 
dispute with mainstream media … 
Clearly such action would be considered bad faith and the mandating of obligations for parties to act in good faith 
would give the franchisor access to remedies for code breaches in these circumstances.148 
Whilst the inclusion of such a list may be instructive, it is always for the court to determine the question based 
on the precise circumstances of each individual case. Importantly, it may: 
… add to the sentiment of over regulation in the franchising industry, particularly from the perspective of overseas 
investors. It may also lead [to] would-be franchisors deciding to pursue a different business model, which would 
have the effect of decreasing participation in the sector.149 
There are foreseeable difficulties in interpreting the obligation to act in good faith in the context of a relational 
contract such as a franchise agreement. However, the inclusion of such a duty would allow the courts to 
consider, on a case by case basis, the nature of the obligation and the types of conduct that breach it. This would 
allow fine tuning of the relevant provision in the future as the jurisprudence around good faith in franchising 
emerges. 
Key issue—transfer, renewal and end of term arrangements  
Franchisors impeding transfer of franchise by franchisees  
When a franchisee decides to sell his or her franchise business, the franchisor may have a number of options 
open to it, depending on the nature of the franchise agreement: 
• the franchisor may have an option to buy the business for itself. In that case the franchisor may decide to 
operate a company owned franchise business at the relevant site 
• the franchisor may allow the franchisee to sell the franchise business based on the franchise agreement 
which is in force or  
• the franchisor may opt to allow the franchisee to sell the franchise business based on a new franchise 
agreement.150  
Where the franchisor requires a sale to proceed based on a new agreement, delays in updating the franchise 
agreement may defer the sale process. In addition, the changes to the franchise agreement may make the 
franchise less attractive to a prospective purchaser by, for example, reducing the term of the agreement, the 
extent of the franchisee territory or other changes that reduce the expected return on investment for the 
incoming franchisee.151 These concerns were raised in a submission to the Wein review by the LPO Group, which 
argued that: 
Australia Post is also taking advantage of the assignment process to make amendments to individual License 
Agreements. Consent to assignment is withheld until the purchasers agree to changes to the existing Licence, in 
breach of the original Agreement. Vendors are informed by Australia Post that they have no say in this process as 
the Agreement is between the purchaser and Australia Post and does not extend to the vendor. This effectively 
147.  This is discussed under the heading of ‘Enforcement’ in this research paper. 
148.  P Colman (Mason Sier Turnbull Lawyers), Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 12 February 2013, p. 8, accessed 
24 October 2013. 
149.  Minter Ellison Lawyers, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, February 2013, p. 5, accessed 24 October 2013. 
150.  Franchise agreements commonly give franchisors the ability to change the terms of the agreement unilaterally. 
151. Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., pp. 63–64.   
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means an existing Licensee has no right to sell the business they own and operate, and the means to realise the 
return on the capital investment has been greatly diminished, if not extinguished.152  
Nevertheless, the expert panel acknowledged that: 
…there may be legitimate commercial and regulatory reasons for the franchisor to amend the franchise agreement; 
these amendments may take effect in some agreements toward the end of the term while in others toward the 
beginning. It is therefore not appropriate to prohibit this behaviour.153 [emphasis added] 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments  
In order to balance the rights of franchisors to amend the franchise agreement against those of franchisees at 
the time of sale of a franchise, the 2010 amendments contained the following changes to the Code: 
• a definition of the term novation was inserted into clause 3 of the Code154 
• item 17A of the disclosure document requires franchisors to disclose the circumstances in which the 
franchisor has unilaterally varied a franchise agreement in the last three financial years and the 
circumstances in which unilateral variations to their agreement may take place in the future and  
• item 17D of the disclosure document requires disclosure about whether the franchisor will amend the 
franchise agreement on or before the transfer or novation of a franchise agreement.  
Novation or transfer 
The Queensland Law Society argued that the definition of novation which had been inserted into the Code does 
not ‘reflect normal practice’ and ‘should be clarified’.155 Other submitters agreed that ‘the terminology in the 
Code does not reflect the way in which franchisors typically require franchise business sales to occur’.156   
There is a difference between a franchisee seeking a purchaser for his or her business and a franchisor seeking a 
potential franchisee whose values and work ethic are consistent with the franchisor’s and who will bring 
financial resources to the franchise business. Where the sale of an existing franchisee business involves the 
execution of a new agreement, the purchaser is entitled to all the rights afforded to a prospective franchisee. As 
the initial negotiations occur between the existing and potential franchisees rather than between the franchisor 
and the potential franchisee the time taken by a franchisor to consent to a sale may be exacerbated by a lack of 
information about a potential purchaser. 
According to the Wein review, novation ‘is a highly technical area of the law … but in the short time it has been 
in place it has raised nascent concerns about how the provisions actually operate when placed up against what is 
happening in the marketplace’.157 As it was clear that ‘some confusion could result from the present wording’, 
the Wein review made recommendations to clarify the time limits within which the franchisor must consent to a 
transfer of a franchise agreement.158 
Wein review recommendation 
The Wein review recommended that subclause 20(4) of the Code be amended to read:  
a. The franchisor is taken to have given consent to the transfer or novation if the franchisor does not, 
within 42 days after the request was made, or all information reasonably required by the franchisor 
under the franchise agreement has been provided, whichever is the latter, give to the franchisee written 
notice: 
(i) that consent is withheld; and 
152.  LPO Group, op. cit., accessed 24 October 2013. 
153.  Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. xii. 
154.  As set out at footnote 93, under clause 3 of the Code, novation in relation to a franchise means the termination of the franchise and entry 
into a new franchise with a proposed transferee on the same terms as the terminated franchise. Transfer, under clause 3 of the Code, 
includes an arrangement in which the franchise is granted, transferred or sold.  
155.  Queensland Law Society, op. cit., accessed 24 October 2013. 
156.  D Sutherland, op. cit., p. 20, accessed 24 October 2013. 
157.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 83. 
158.  Ibid., p. 86. 
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(ii) setting out why consent is withheld.  
b. The franchisee should take all reasonable steps to provide all information required under the franchise 
agreement to enable the franchisor to be able to properly evaluate the request. [Amendments 
underlined]159 
Government response 
The recommendation was accepted in principle, with the former Labor Government noting that ‘some 
franchisees have expressed concern that the proposed wording may allow a franchisor to frustrate or delay the 
transfer or novation by repeatedly requesting additional information from the franchisee’.160 
Renewal and end of term arrangements 
The Corporations and Financial Services Committee considered the following matters related to end of 
agreement arrangements: 
• whether there should be an automatic right of renewal at the end of the first term of a franchise agreement 
or whether non-renewal by a franchisor should only be permitted where ‘good cause’ can be shown 
• the circumstances in which a franchisor should be able to terminate an agreement, including potential 
abuses of current termination provisions within the Code (churning) 
• whether a payment for the franchisee’s contributed value to the business (goodwill) should be mandated if 
the agreement is terminated or not renewed for any reason.161 
The Corporations and Financial Services Committee recommended that the Code be amended to require 
franchisors to disclose to franchisees, before a franchising agreement is entered into, what process will apply in 
determining end of term arrangements.162 It did not support an automatic right of renewal or the requirement 
for good cause to be shown for not renewing a franchise agreement acknowledging that ‘it is not the role of the 
law to force unwilling parties to enter into any commercial arrangement, including franchise agreements’.163 The 
expert panel did not express a contrary view.164 
In addition, the Corporations and Financial Services Committee stated: 
While the committee recognises the commercial arguments underlying the application of restraint of trade clauses 
during the time in which a franchisee and franchisor have a working relationship, it is the view of the committee 
that it may not be appropriate in all circumstances for such restraints to apply once the franchise agreement has 
ended. The committee notes the severe restrictions that such restraints might impose on the ability of former 
franchisees to generate income as independent businesspeople.165  
Whilst the Corporations and Financial Services Committee considered restraint of trade issues, it did not make 
any specific recommendation about them. The expert panel did not consider restraint of trade issues as part of 
its review. 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments 
The 2010 amendments inserted clause 20A into the Code to require a franchisor to notify the franchisee, at least 
six months before the end of the term of the franchise agreement, whether the franchisor would renew the 
franchise agreement and if so, whether the franchisee would be required to enter into a new franchise 
agreement. Item 17C of the disclosure statement sets out in full the matters to be disclosed. 
The Regulatory Impact Statement for the 2010 amendments states: 
… there is a common belief among franchisees, even when their agreements are for a fixed term, that they would 
be entitled to renew their agreement when it expires. 
159. Ibid., recommendation 11, p. 86. 
160.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 14. 
161.  Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, op. cit., pp. 61–82. 
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However, franchising by definition involves a franchisor granting a franchisee a right to carry on the business under 
a franchise business model offered and controlled by the franchisor for a specified period of time. The franchisee 
pays the franchisor a fee in exchange for the use of the franchisor’s brand and systems. There is neither an 
automatic right of renewal of franchise agreements nor a right to compensation (via an exit payment) for 
franchisees if a franchisor decides not to renew a franchise agreement.166 
According to the Wein review, ‘there are disparate views on whether the 2010 amendments have been 
effective’.167 On the one hand, many submitters acknowledged that franchisees are better informed about end 
of term arrangements due to the inclusion in the Code of clause 20A and the terms of item 17C of the disclosure 
document.168  
Franchisee rights to payment for goodwill 
On the other hand, some submitters contend that the amendments do not remedy the harm which is perceived 
to be caused by the franchisor because there is nothing in the Code ‘that prevents a franchisor not renewing an 
agreement, and simply taking over the thriving business that the franchisee has established through his own 
hard work and investment’.169 According to Competitive Foods Australia, ‘the amendments have not been 
effective because they do not recognise property rights for the franchisee. Instead they make franchising look 
like retail leasing, which it is not’.170  
Those who argue in favour of such rights consider that they crystallise at the end of the franchise agreement and 
should be recognised by mandating a payment for the value that the franchisee has contributed to the 
business—goodwill— if the agreement is terminated or not renewed for any reason. This point of view has been 
aired during the course of each of the reviews of franchising laws and practice since 2008 but has failed to gain 
traction.171 The Federal Court of Australia has found that there is no entitlement to payment for goodwill.172 
Wein review recommendation 
The Wein review recommended an amendment to the Code to offer limited protection to franchisees when the 
franchisor declines to renew a franchise agreement. It recommended that, if certain conditions are satisfied, 
restraint of trade clauses in the franchise agreement, which prevent the franchisee from carrying on a similar 
business in competition with the franchisor, are not enforceable by the franchisor against the franchisee.173 
Those conditions are that: 
• the franchisee wishes to have the franchise agreement renewed on substantially the same terms 
• the franchisee is not in breach of the agreement 
• the agreement does not contain provisions allowing a franchisee to make a claim for compensation in the 
event that the franchise is not renewed and 
• the franchisee abides by all confidentiality clauses in the agreement and does not infringe the intellectual 
property of the franchisor.  
Government response 
The former Labor Government accepted this recommendation, stating that: 
166.  Regulatory impact statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2010 (No. 1), p. 15, accessed 
7 November 2013. 
167.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 89. 
168.  DLA Piper, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 15 February 2013, p. 6, accessed 24 October 2013 and J Gehrke 
(Franchise Advisory Centre) and L Frazer (Griffith University), Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 22 February 2013, 
p. 15, accessed 24 October 2013. 
169.  P Abetz, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, February 2013, p. 7, accessed 24 October 2013. 
170.  Competitive Foods Australia Pty Ltd, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 15 February 2013, p. 18, accessed 
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the Government will also ensure that restraint of trade clauses are unenforceable not only in cases of non-renewal 
… but also where the franchisor has not extended a franchise agreement, and where the franchisor has terminated 
the franchise agreement ‘without cause’ and the other conditions set out in the recommendation are met.174  
Comment—applying the common law 
The position is that a right to payment for goodwill upon expiry or termination of the franchise term exists only if 
it is set out in the franchise agreement. In the absence of such a term, no such right exists. The Wein review 
recommendation, however, recognises the unfairness of a franchisee being restrained from competing with the 
franchise in circumstances where the franchisor’s actions have brought about the end of the franchise 
arrangements and without compensation for the goodwill generated by the former franchisee. In a sense, the 
right to compete can be seen to some extent as compensation for the absence of compensation for goodwill. 
However, set against the existing law on restraint of trade, the value of the Wein recommendation is open to 
question. Subject to some exceptions, a restraint of trade contract is void as a matter of public policy. For 
instance, a restraint of trade may be justified if it is reasonable as between the parties175 and it is not contrary to 
the public interest.176 In essence, the recommendation is merely an application of the common law position. 
That being the case, from a franchisee perspective, the recommendation delivers very little, given that a 
restraint of trade clause may not be enforceable anyway. 
The recommendation is also open to the criticism that it may be easy for a franchisor to avoid and that a 
franchisor may engage in ‘mischievous’ conduct by manufacturing the circumstances required to enable it to 
avoid being bound by a restraint of trade clause. According to the former Labor Government, those concerns 
would be addressed by the decision to introduce a good faith requirement.177  
Key issue—dispute resolution 
Dispute resolution behaviours  
Submitters to the Corporations and Financial Services Committee reported a reluctance on the part of some 
franchisees to engage in mediation due to ‘fear of retribution; potentially high costs; a sense that franchisors are 
unlikely to engage in meaningful negotiation; and the possibility the franchisors will draw out the process in 
order to pressure the franchisee into giving in to franchisor demands’.178 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments 
In making the 2010 amendments, the Government recognised that there was: 
… limited data on what types of behaviour, by one party to a franchise dispute are typically viewed as indicators of a 
genuine attempt by that party in resolving their dispute. Similarly, there is limited data on the numbers of franchise 
sector participants that may be subject to unconstructive or unscrupulous conduct during dispute resolution.179 
That being the case, the 2010 amendments to the Code inserted a non-exhaustive list of behaviours (at 
subclause 29(8) of the Code) that parties to a franchising dispute could exhibit to indicate that they are engaging 
in dispute resolution in a constructive manner.  
The Wein review received submissions which indicated on the one hand that there remained an unwillingness 
and refusal on the part of some franchisors and franchisees to attend mediation and resolve disputes.180 In 
particular, concerns were expressed that the amendment requiring parties to ‘approach the resolution of the 
dispute in a reconciliatory manner’ was too vague a concept.181 On the other hand, submitters such as the Office 
174.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., pp. 14–15. 
175.  An example of an effective restraint clause is in Raine & Horne Pty Ltd v Adacol Pty Ltd [2006] NSWSC 36.  
176.  Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company Ltd [1894] AC 535. The passage was expressly approved as stating the 
common law in Australia in Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353 at p 376.  
177.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 15. 
178.  Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, op. cit., p. 86. This point is reiterated by E Spencer and S Young, 
Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 14 February 2013, p. 25, accessed 24 October 2013. 
179.  Regulatory Impact Statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2010 (No. 1), p. 57. 
180.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 112.  
181.  Law Society of South Australia, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 21 February 2013, p. 8, accessed 24 October 
2013. 
 
 
Franchising in Australia: striking a balance or tipping the balance? 27 
                                                             
 
of the Franchising Mediation Adviser considered that the ‘processes are operating effectively’.182 According to 
Spencer and Young: 
… compelling “genuine, reconciliatory participation” in mediation is a contradiction in terms; for mediation to be 
genuinely successful (and successful in the long term) participation must be genuine and consensual. But no law can 
enforce a state of mind.183 
State based small business commissioners 
Importantly, some states have established small business commissioners to offer low cost alternative dispute 
resolution services—including for franchising disputes.184 According to the Office of the Franchising Mediation 
Adviser (OFMA), ‘the different Small Business Commissioners around Australia play a useful role in advising and 
assisting with problems at an early stage and in this respect are complementary to our role’.185  
However, in cases where a franchising dispute is mediated using services other than those of the OFMA, the 
parties do not have to comply with the behaviours which were inserted by the 2010 amendments to the Code. 
One submitter provided the example of a franchisee who had ‘embarked on an aggressive social media and 
media campaign pending mediation, which has in turn incited death threats against the directors of a 
franchisor’.186 
Another submitter provided anecdotal evidence of a dispute that was referred to a state Small Business 
Commissioner by a franchisee. In that case, the franchisor’s solicitors advised the Small Business Commissioner 
that they wanted the dispute resolution to be conducted in accordance with Part 4 of the Code or the method 
set out in their franchise agreement, but this was refused. In light of that experience, it has been suggested that: 
the ACCC and the small business commissioners need to have a protocol on how franchise disputes are to be 
resolved or it means the whole Part 4 process of the Code is useless if the dispute is referred to a state small 
business commissioner.187 
The Law Council of Australia concurred with that suggestion.188  
Wein review recommendation 
The Wein review recommended that the Code should be amended to provide that subclause 29(8) applies to 
participation in any alternative dispute resolution process whether under OFMA, state small business 
commissioners, privately retained, court appointed or otherwise.189 
Government response 
The former Labor Government accepted the recommendation—and in particular acknowledged that ‘there is 
some ambiguity where the parties do not purport to be mediating under the Code, or do not turn their mind to 
the issue prior to attending mediation’.190 
That being the case, the former Government agreed to amend the Code to make it clear that franchisors and 
franchisees should abide by the behaviours set out in subclause 29(8) in any mediation, whether under the Code 
or not.191 
182.  Office of the Franchising Mediation Adviser, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 13 February 2013, p. 1, accessed 
24 October 2013. 
183.  E Spencer and S Young, op. cit., accessed 24 October 2013. 
184.  Small Business Commissioner Act 2013 (NSW) (NSW Small Business Commissioner website); Small Business Commissioner Act 2003 (Vic) 
(Victorian Small Business Commissioner website); Small Business Development Corporation Act 1983 (WA) (WA Small Business Commissioner 
website) 
185.  Office of the Franchising Mediation Adviser, op. cit., p. 1. 
186.  P Colman (Mason Sier Turnbull Lawyers), op. cit., p. 4. 
187.  D Sutherland, op. cit., pp.32–33, accessed 24 October 2013. 
188.  Law Council of Australia, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 22 February 2013, p. 3, accessed 24 October 2013. 
189.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., recommendation 13, p. 116. 
190.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., pp. 15–16. 
191.  Ibid. 
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Comment 
Section 51AEA of the Competition and Consumer Act provides that it is the Parliament’s intention that a law of a 
State or Territory should be able to operate concurrently with Part IVB unless the law is directly inconsistent 
with that Part. 
Whilst the recommendation is consistent with those terms, the reasons for the drift of franchisees to the Small 
Business Commissioners away from the OFMA do not appear to have been identified and addressed.  
Key issues—attribution of legal costs to franchisees 
The decision to implement the Code as a mandatory code in 1998 was influenced by a desire to address the 
major problems in the sector, including the high cost of actions under the then Trade Practices Act 1974 (since 
renamed as the CCA) and the difficulties experienced by franchisees in obtaining redress from an infringing 
franchisor.192    
Nevertheless, franchisees can still face significant expenses because, as the expert review observed, under some 
franchise agreements, franchisees may be required to pay the franchisor’s legal costs incurred in dispute 
resolution generally or in relation to specific kinds of dispute resolution, like mediation.193 
In relation to the costs of mediation, the expert panel noted that the Code (at that time) provided that parties 
were equally liable for the costs of mediation unless they agree otherwise and that the parties were to pay for 
their own costs of attending mediation. That said, the expert panel conceded that there might not be 
meaningful agreement about the payment of the costs of mediation due to the imbalance of bargaining power 
between a franchisor and franchisee.194 
In relation to legal costs, other than for mediation in accordance with the Code, the expert panel noted that a 
wide variety of commercial agreements contain clauses attributing the costs of dispute resolution to one or 
other of the parties to the agreement. The expert panel acknowledged that there may be legitimate business 
reasons to include such a clause, which might be reflected for example in a lower franchise fee under the 
agreement.  
That being the case, the expert panel did not believe that ‘steps should be taken to prohibit or restrict such 
provisions in franchising, without fully understanding the possible implications for the wider business 
community’.195  
Effectiveness of earlier amendments 
Responding to the comments of the expert panel, the 2010 amendments inserted item 13B into the disclosure 
document, requiring the franchisor to disclose whether he or she would attribute their legal costs incurred in 
dispute resolution to the franchisee. Clause 31 of the Code provided (prior to the 2010 amendments) that the 
parties were equally liable for the ‘costs of mediation’ unless they agreed otherwise. Subclause 31(4) was 
inserted into the Code by the 2010 amendments to put beyond doubt what specific costs the term ‘costs of 
mediation’ covered—that is, the cost of the mediator, room hire and of any additional input (including expert 
reports) that were agreed by both parties as being necessary to the conduct of the mediation. 
Few submitters to the Wein review commented on the effectiveness or otherwise of the amendments about the 
attribution of legal costs. However, one submitter was critical of item 13B of the disclosure document as it 
merely requires disclosure of whether or not the franchisor will attribute the costs of ‘dispute resolution’ to the 
franchisee.196 It was asserted that item 13B does nothing to address the harm to a franchisee who may be 
required by a franchisor to pay all the costs of dispute resolution (other than mediation), including litigation.  
Another submitter complained of franchise agreements which require the franchisee to litigate any proceedings 
in the home state of the franchisor—thereby increasing the costs to be borne by an aggrieved franchisee—and 
advocated an amendment which would:  
192.   Explanatory Statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Regulations 1998, accessed 26 August 2013. 
193.  Strengthening statutory unconscionable conduct and the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., pp. 67. 
194.  Ibid., p. 66. 
195.  Ibid., p. 69. 
196.  D Sutherland, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 14 February 2013, p.10, accessed 24 October 2013. 
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… give franchisees the right to litigate and bring alternative dispute resolution proceedings in their home State, and 
that the laws of their home State govern the franchise … [on the grounds that] … if a franchisor chooses to do 
business in a particular State, they should abide by that State’s laws and submit to the jurisdiction of its courts.197 
Wein review recommendation 
The Wein review recommended that the Code be amended to ensure that franchisors cannot: 
• attribute the legal costs of dispute resolution to a franchisee unless ordered by a court (recommendation 
14a) or 
• require a franchisee to litigate outside the jurisdiction in which the franchisee’s business primarily operates 
(recommendation 14b).198 
Government response 
The former Labor Government accepted recommendation 14a in principle, stating that it would amend the Code 
to prevent a franchisor attributing the costs of dispute resolution to a franchisee in the franchise agreement.  
In relation to recommendation 14b, the government response was to act to preserve the parties’ ability to 
negotiate a suitable forum for their disputes. It pledged to include mechanisms in the Code to ‘ensure that an 
appropriate court, such as the court in the jurisdiction in which the franchisee conducts its business, will deal 
with the dispute’.199 
Comment—costs of dispute resolution 
The implementation of recommendation 14a may remove one of the barriers to effective dispute resolution for 
franchisees. 
According to the Wein review the rationale for recommendation 14b was that it is ‘a more direct means of 
reducing the cost to franchisees of raising a dispute with their franchisor’.200 However, for those franchisors 
which have franchisees in a number of states, there is a danger that outcomes of disputes will vary—particularly 
in relation to questions of good faith—depending on the jurisprudence in each state.  
Key issue—enforcement 
Section 51AD of the CCA provides that ‘a corporation must not, in trade or commerce, contravene an applicable 
industry code’. If a franchisor fails, for example, to provide disclosure documents as required by the Code, it will 
be in breach of the Code and, correspondingly, in breach of the CCA. Following several contradictory 
decisions,201 the High Court has made it clear that a failure to comply with the Code does not necessarily render 
a franchise agreement void for illegality and therefore unenforceable.202 This means that where the franchisor 
has not complied with the Code, the onus is on the franchisee to seek one of the remedies set out in the CCA. 
The question for many franchisees is what, exactly, is the penalty to be applied to a franchisor whose conduct is 
a breach of the Code. 
Current regulatory framework—Commonwealth 
A breach of the Code is a breach of section 51AD (in Part IVB) of the CCA. The remedies available for a breach of 
the Code include injunctions,203 damages204 and other remedial orders,205 including third party redress.206 The 
ACCC, which enforces compliance with the Code, can also issue a public warning notice for likely breaches of the 
Code.207 
197.  C Dorrian, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 15 February 2013, p. 10, accessed 24 October 2013. 
198.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 123. 
199.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 16. 
200.   Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 123. 
201.  Ketchell v Master of Education Services [2005] NSWSC 399, (29 April 2005), accessed 24 October 2013 and Hoy Mobile Pty Ltd v Allphones Pty 
Ltd (No.2) [2008] FCA 810, accessed 28 August 2013.  
202.  Master Education Services Pty Limited v Ketchell [2008] HCA 36, (27 August 2008), accessed 24 October 2013. 
203.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 80. 
204.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 82. 
205.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 86C. 
206.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 51ADB. 
207.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 51ADA. 
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While the contravention of certain provisions of the CCA attracts civil pecuniary penalties, pecuniary penalties 
are not currently available for breaches of the Code.208 Similarly, where the ACCC has reasonable grounds to 
believe that a person has contravened certain provisions of the CCA, the ACCC can issue an infringement notice 
stating the penalty which is payable under the notice.209 However the ACCC is not, currently, empowered to 
issue infringement notices for likely breach of the Code. 
Effectiveness of earlier amendments 
The Corporations and Financial Services Committee recommended that the ACCC be given the power to 
investigate suspected breaches of industry codes—without having to rely on specific complaints from industry 
participants. The Government agreed with this recommendation and the ACCC was subsequently given audit 
powers.210 In addition, the Corporations and Financial Services Committee acknowledged that the ‘lack of 
pecuniary penalties for breaches of the Code means there is insufficient deterrence for conduct that 
contravenes the Code’ and recommended legislative amendments to include pecuniary penalties for Code 
breaches.211 The Government rejected that recommendation indicating that it would ‘keep this matter under 
review and allow time for the extensive improvements which will be made to the Franchising Code to take 
effect’.212  
Amendments in the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No. 2) 2010 implemented a 
strengthened enforcement and redress regime for industry codes of conduct.213 In particular: 
• the ACCC was empowered to issue public warning notices for repeated or serious breaches of prescribed 
industry codes214 
• a Court could issue an order that it considered appropriate to grant redress to a non-party who had suffered 
loss or damage due to a breach of a prescribed industry code215 and 
• the ACCC was given a random audit power to allow it to inspect documents or records required to be kept 
pursuant to a prescribed industry code.216 
Audit power 
The ACCC reports that it has issued audit notices on 16 franchise systems across Australia in the six months to 
30 June 2013.217 However, the submission by the ACCC to the Wein review highlights the limitations of the audit 
power. Even though the ‘ACCC can obtain a franchisor’s disclosure document, it cannot compel the franchisor to 
provide documents or other information that supports the information set out in the disclosure document’.218 
Section 155 of the CCA enables the ACCC to obtain information from a person to whom a notice is directed 
relating to a matter that constitutes, or may constitute, a contravention of the CCA. However, the power to issue 
a notice is predicated on the Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson having reason to believe that the person to 
whom the notice is directed is capable of providing information about a possible contravention of the CCA. It 
cannot, therefore, be utilised to assist the ACCC in its audit function in respect of franchises. 
ACCC compliance and enforcement policy 
The ACCC does not pursue all the complaints it receives and is unlikely to become involved in resolving individual 
consumer or small business disputes. According to its compliance and enforcement policy, the ACCC’s role is to 
focus on those circumstances that harm the competitive process or result in widespread consumer detriment.219  
208.  For example, under section 224 of the Australian Consumer Law (which is located in Schedule 2 to the CCA) penalties of $1.1 million for a 
corporation and $220,000 for a person that is not a body corporate, apply in respect of unconscionable conduct. 
209.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, sections 134–134A. 
210. Inserted by Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No. 2) 2010, accessed 24 October 2013. 
211.  Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, op. cit., p. 124. 
212.  Commonwealth Government Response to Opportunity not opportunism: improving conduct in Australian franchising, op. cit., p. 11.  
213.  Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No. 2) 2010, accessed 24 October 2013. 
214.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 51ADA. 
215.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 51ADB. 
216.  Competition and Consumer Act 2010, section 51ADD. 
217.  ACCC, Small business, franchising and industry codes: half year report no. 6, 2013, p. 3, accessed 24 October 2013. 
218.  ACCC, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 7. 
219.  ACCC, ‘Compliance and enforcement policy‘, ACCC website, accessed 24 October 2013. 
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The effect of this policy, according to one submitter to the Wein review, is that sanctions are only applied ‘at the 
suit of individual franchisees, and then typically, after substantial losses (to those franchisees) and at great cost 
and through all the uncertainties of litigation’.220 
Wein recommendation—civil pecuniary penalties 
In making its recommendations for amendments to the CCA, the Wein review endorsed the views of the 
Australian Small Business Commissioner which advocated a ‘facilitative approach’ to Code compliance, focussing 
on education rather than punishment of non-compliance.221 It recommended that the CCA be amended to allow 
civil pecuniary penalties to a maximum of $50,000 to be available as a remedy for a breach of the Code.222 
Government response 
The Government accepted recommendation 15a in principle. The matter of the amount of the relevant penalty 
requires further consideration. Pecuniary penalties must be consistent with the other penalties in the CCA to 
ensure that they are reasonable and proportionate to the harm caused by the relevant conduct.223  
Comment—pros and cons of civil pecuniary penalties 
The Law Council of Australia (LCA) summarised the various arguments in favour of imposing civil pecuniary 
penalties for a breach of the Code as follows: 
• penalties would operate as an effective deterrent to breaching the Code224 
• due to the cost of justice, franchisees do not possess the resources to pursue franchisors—that is, the sector 
is characterised by an imbalance of power and therefore the state should intervene 
• it is inconsistent that penalties do not exist for a breach of the Code given that penalties exist for other 
breach of the CCA, including the Australian Consumer Law and 
• the introduction of penalties would increase the confidence of investors and parties to a franchise 
agreement.225 
The LCA opined that these points ‘do not outweigh the public cost and regulatory risk associated with the 
introduction of civil penalties’.226 Having set out the reasons for imposition of pecuniary penalties, the LCA 
rebutted each of them and suggested that there are other, more efficient ways of addressing franchisee 
concerns, such as having the ACCC conduct a larger number of audits or the establishment of a Franchising 
Ombudsman.227 In particular, the LCA proposed that more empirical research could be undertaken ‘into the 
nature of the complaints against franchisors by franchisees so as to determine whether introducing civil 
penalties would significantly change the existence of those complaints’.228 
Other submitters to the Wein review rejected the proposition outright. For instance, the Australian National 
Retailers Association said that the imposition of pecuniary penalties ‘would not be consistent with how other 
industry codes are enforced and their purpose, which is to enforce minimum standards rather than act as 
another form of regulation’.229 Minter Ellison Lawyers referred to the comments of the High Court in Ketchell’s 
case that ‘the purpose of the Code is to regulate the conduct of persons in the franchising industry in order to 
improve business practices, to provide some protection to franchisees proposing to enter into franchise 
220.  Franchisees Association of Australia Incorporated, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 2 February 2013, p. 4, 
accessed 24 October 2013. 
221.  Review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, op. cit., p. 145. 
222.  Ibid., recommendation 15a. 
223.  Penalties are drafted in accordance with the terms of the Guide to framing Commonwealth offences, infringement notices and enforcement 
powers, accessed 24 October 2013. 
224.  M Terceiro, legal practitioner agrees with this point stating that that if the ACCC had access to civil pecuniary penalties for Franchising Code 
breaches, its ability and willingness to enforce the Franchising Code would be significantly enhanced. M Terceiro, Submission to the review of 
the Franchising Code of Conduct, 22 February 2013, p. 4, accessed 24 October 2013. 
225.  Law Council of Australia, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, 22 February 2013, p. 16, accessed 24 October 2013. 
226.  Ibid. 
227.  Ibid., p. 22. 
228.  Ibid. 
229.  Australian National Retailers Association, Submission to the review of the Franchising Code of Conduct, February 2013, p. 14, accessed 24 
October 2013.  
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agreements and to decrease litigation’.230 They said that ‘conferring additional powers on the ACCC to issue 
penalties for Code breaches is, in the circumstances unnecessary and arguably inappropriate’.231 
Comment—lack of consistency across jurisdictions 
Given the push by some states—particularly South Australia—to impose their own laws and penalties for 
perceived improper franchising conduct, it seems that the imposition of civil pecuniary penalties for breach of 
the Code is now inevitable.232 Despite the recommendation and its acceptance by the Government there has 
been some scepticism about its usefulness: 
The reality is that the ACCC rarely brings civil proceedings against franchisees or franchisors that have breached the 
Code alone and that with the higher standard of proof required in a proceeding seeking civil pecuniary penalties, it 
is unlikely that the ACCC would issue such proceedings, given its other enforcement powers.233  
Wein review recommendation—infringement notices and audit powers 
The Wein review also recommended that the ACCC be allowed to: 
• issue an infringement notice for a breach of the Code (recommendation 15b) and 
• use its random audit powers to assess a franchisor’s compliance with all aspects of the Code, not just to 
require the production of documents created under the Code (recommendation 15c). 
Government response 
The former Labor Government accepted recommendation 15b on the grounds that infringement notices will act 
as a deterrent to breaches of the Code and this, together with a pecuniary penalty regime, is necessary to 
promote effective compliance with the Code.234 
At present the ACCC may issue an infringement notice under clauses 134–134A of Schedule 2 to the CCA where 
it has reasonable grounds to believe that a person has contravened certain consumer protection laws. Once an 
infringement notice penalty is paid, the ACCC may not commence court proceedings in relation to the alleged 
contravention. In addition payment is noted on the ACCC’s infringement register which is published on its 
website.235 That being the case, the information about the payment will be able to be ascertained by any 
prospective (or existing) franchisee even though infringement notices do not need to be recorded in the 
disclosure document. However, there is no guarantee that a prospective franchisee will include a review of the 
ACCC’s infringement register as part of his or her due diligence. 
The Government accepted recommendation 15c that the ACCC should be able to investigate a party’s 
compliance with all aspects of the Code.  
Wein review recommendation—court orders 
The Wein review also made the following recommendations in relation to the orders that a court may make 
under the CCA: 
• that a breach of the Code should be a matter about which a court may make an order under section 86E to 
disqualify a person from managing corporations (recommendation 15d) and  
• that the court can make franchising specific orders under section 87, including orders requiring a franchisor 
to give a royalty free period or to pay a sum of money into a marketing or cooperative fund applicable to that 
franchise system (recommendation 15e). 
230.  Master Education Services Pty Limited v Ketchell [2008] HCA 36, (27 August 2008), paragraph 25. 
231.  Minter Ellison Lawyers, op., cit., February 2013, pp. 7–8.  
232.  Small Business Commissioner Act 2011 (SA) amended the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA) to establish a Small Business Commissioner empowered 
to deal with contraventions of industry codes (section 28F) and for the imposition of civil pecuniary penalties of up to $50,000 for a 
corporation and $10,000 for a natural person who contravenes an industry code (section 86B).  
233.  P Colman (Mason Sier Turnbull Lawyers), op. cit., p. 12. 
234.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 17. 
235.  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), ‘Infringement Notices (Trade Practices Act s. 87ZE)‘, ACCC website, accessed 
24 October 2013. 
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Government response 
The former Labor Government did not agree that disqualification from being a company director is necessarily 
appropriate as it is a serious penalty more appropriately directed towards conduct which is found to be 
unconscionable or where false and misleading statements have been made. However, it was noted that there 
may be scope for a compromise by way of a partial disqualification power which would allow a person to be 
banned from being a franchisor, or participating in the franchising sector, either indefinitely or for a limited 
period of time. The former Labor Government indicated that it would further consider this possibility.236  
It also noted the terms of recommendation 15e but considered that the court already has the power to make 
orders that are tailored to the circumstances of the case under the enforcement provisions of the CCA. Those 
orders are not industry specific but rather aimed at remedying the harm caused by the conduct in question. That 
being the case the former Labor Government did not intend to amend section 87 of the CCA.237 
Comment—departure from other industry codes 
It is significant that recommendation 15a which has been accepted in principle, and recommendations 15b and 
15c which have been accepted in full are not intended to apply to other existing industry codes238 ‘nor is it 
intended that they set any precedent for any future industry codes’.239 The result is likely to be an increasingly 
complex legislative framework which treats a breach of the Franchising Code of Conduct differently and arguably 
more harshly than a breach of other industry codes.  
Future review 
The Wein review recommended that the Code should not be subject to further review until five years after any 
amendments arising out the review take effect.240 Whilst the Government accepted the recommendation in 
principle, it stopped short of setting a time limit on the next review stating only that it was committed to 
ensuring that the franchising industry would benefit from having time for the amendments that flow from the 
review to take effect before they are assessed.241 
Conclusion 
The franchise industry has been the subject of a number of inquiries at the state and Commonwealth level since 
2006. This has led to amendments to the Code in order to ameliorate the hardship which has been reported by 
many franchisees. In addition, there have been, since 2006, significant steps to update the CCA including the 
codification of the prohibition against unconscionable conduct. 
The Wein review canvassed many of the same issues that were the subject of those earlier inquiries. It assessed 
the relevant amendments and found some of them to be ineffective or only partially effective. The 
recommendations in the Wein review ‘mop up’ existing gaps—generally with a view to tipping the balance of the 
franchise relationship in favour of franchisees. 
An important aspect of the Wein review is the identification of the need for further education for prospective 
franchisees to ensure that they have a complete understanding of the nature of the franchise agreement and 
the legal commitment which they will make if it is entered into. However, even improved education is no 
substitute for better franchisee selection. The particular nature of the franchisor-franchisee relationship means 
selecting the right franchisee from the outset is in the best long-term commercial interests of both the 
franchisor and franchisee. The franchisor’s resources that are required to ‘support unsuitable franchisees can 
outweigh the advantages to be gained by franchising, and may even contribute to the failure of the 
franchisor’.242 
That being the case, without targeted and appropriate selection of franchisees by franchisors, the repeating 
themes of complaints about franchising will continue. As the Industrial Relations Commission put it: 
236.  Forward looking franchise regulation, op. cit., p. 17. 
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Overall, the applicants’ evidence seems to me to establish that they were approaching this business with the degree 
of gullibility so often found in unsuccessful franchise operators. They were taking a view of their prospects which 
was if not irrational, certainly over-brimming with confidence.243  
The challenge for the new Abbott Government will be to consider the Wein review recommendations afresh and 
to apply an even handed response which does not unduly tip the balance of the franchise relationship too far in 
favour of franchisees—to the detriment of franchising generally. 
  
243.  Oraka Pty Limited and Wendy’s Supa Sundaes v Pilgrim and Ors [2004] NSWIRComm 39 (12 March 2004), accessed 24 October 2013. 
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Appendix 1 
Summary of 2007 amendments to the Code 
 
Franchisees will be provided with a copy of the franchise agreement in the form it is intended to be executed 
with the disclosure document. No longer will it be an option to provide only a summary of the franchise 
agreement.  
Copies of documents relating to the franchise agreement, where available, will be provided at least 14 days 
before the franchise agreement is signed. Where the documents are not available at that time, the documents 
are to be provided to the franchisee or prospective franchisee when they become available. 
Details of section 87B undertakings under the TPA by franchisors will have to be disclosed to franchisees within 
14 days, rather than the 60 days previously required. These undertakings are voluntary and legally enforceable 
undertakings that a party may give to the ACCC to, for example, settle or avoid proceedings alleging that the 
party has breached the TPA. 
Franchisors will be required to disclose from whom they receive rebates and financial benefits.   
Details of the expenses of marketing and other cooperative funds will need to be provided by franchisors to 
franchisees, and the provision allowing franchisees (if 75 per cent of them agree) to choose that annual audits 
not be undertaken will be continued. However that this decision will have to be renewed every three years. 
The last known particulars of name(s) and contact details of each ex-franchisee will be disclosed, unless the ex-
franchisee requests that it be withheld. Franchisors will not be required to update this contact information nor 
keep it for more than three years.  
The business experience of all ‘officers’ of the franchisor (as defined by the Corporations Act 2001) will need to 
be disclosed.  
Financial reports will have to be supplied within four months, rather than three months, in line with the 
Corporations Act 2001. 
Prospective franchisees to whom Annexure 2 applies will be able to request any of the additional information in 
Annexure 1 (the ‘long form’).  
Disclosure of materially relevant facts to franchisees will have to be provided within 14 days rather than 60 days 
which is considered to be an unreasonably long period of time. 
Foreign franchisors will no longer be exempt from the Code. It is considered that all franchise systems operating 
in Australia should be subject to the same rules and protection through the Code and its disclosure requirements 
should be afforded to those dealing with foreign franchisors.  
Materially relevant facts concerning franchisor directors will need to be disclosed to prospective and existing 
franchisees and the scope of disclosure will extend from just serious offences (defined as an offence under any 
Australian law for which there is a jail term of more than five years for a first conviction) to also include 
contravention of any provision of the Corporations Act 2001.  
Franchisors will be forbidden from inhibiting prospective franchisees from communicating with each other or 
existing franchisees. This is in addition to the prohibition on franchisors inhibiting franchisees from 
communicating with each other for lawful purposes. 
General waivers (that is, broad disclaimers), regarding prior written or verbal representations, will not be 
permitted in franchise agreements.   
Where the franchisor is part of a consolidated entity required to produce audited financial reports under the 
Corporations Act 2001 for that consolidated entity, those reports will need to be provided to franchisees on 
request. In the case of foreign franchisors, the use of their local accounting standards and auditors will be 
accepted.  
The details and history of the territory or site to be franchised will need to be provided together with the 
disclosure document.  
The definition of ‘associate’ of a franchisor will include a person who supplies real property to a franchisee. This 
will mean that it will be clear that franchisors will have to disclose information about rental and other property 
expenses. 
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A copy of the Code will have to be provided with the disclosure document. 
A current disclosure document will need to be provided when either the scope or term of a franchise agreement 
is proposed to be extended. 
A disclosure document in accordance with Annexure 1 will be required if the annual turnover of the franchised 
business is expected to be $50,000 or more at any time during the term of the agreement.  
Franchisors will be able to charge a prospective franchisee for reasonable expenses incurred if an agreement is 
terminated by the prospective franchisee within the ‘cooling off’ period. Reasonable expenses will be permitted 
to be deducted from the amount returned if the expenses or their method of calculation have been set up in the 
agreement. 
Conditions within the franchise agreement will have to be noted, that deal with obligations for a franchisee 
regarding site and premises selection and acquisition as well as maintenance and appearance of site and 
premises, vehicles and equipment. 
Source: Explanatory Statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2007 (No. 1), accessed 24 
October 2013. 
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Appendix 2 
Summary of the recommendations of the Corporations and Financial Services Committee 
 
Recommendation 1: that the Franchising Code of Conduct be amended to require that disclosure documents 
include a clear statement by franchisors of the liabilities and consequences applying to franchisees in the event 
of franchisor failure. 
Recommendation 2: the government investigate the benefits of developing a simple online registration system 
for Australian franchisors, requiring them on an annual basis to lodge a statement confirming the nature and 
extent of their franchising network and providing a guarantee that they are meeting their obligations under the 
Franchising Code of Conduct and the Trade Practices Act 1974. 
Recommendation 3: the government review the efficacy of the 1 March 2008 amendments to the disclosure 
provisions of the Franchising Code of Conduct within two years of them taking effect. 
Recommendation 4: the government explore avenues to better balance the rights and liabilities of franchisees 
and franchisors in the event of franchisor failure. 
Recommendation 5: the Franchising Code of Conduct be amended to require franchisors to disclose to 
franchisees, before a franchising agreement is entered into, what process will apply in determining end of term 
arrangements. That process should give due regard to the potential transferability of equity in the value of the 
business as a going concern. 
Recommendation 6:  the name of the Office of the Mediation Adviser be changed to the Officer of the 
Franchising Mediation Adviser and that the Franchising Code of Conduct be amended to reflect this change. 
Recommendation 7: the government require the Australian Bureau of Statistics to develop mechanisms for 
collecting and publishing relevant statistics on the franchising sector. 
Recommendation 8: the following new clause be inserted into the Franchising Code of Conduct: 
6  Standard of Conduct 
Franchisors, franchisees and prospective franchisees shall act in good faith in relation to all aspects of the 
agreement. 
Recommendation 9: the Trade Practices Act 1974 be amended to include pecuniary penalties for breaches of 
the Franchising Code of Conduct. 
Recommendation 10: consideration be given to amending the Trade Practices Act 1974 to provide for pecuniary 
penalties in relation to breaches of section 51AC, section 52, and the other mandatory industry codes under 
section 51AD. 
Recommendation 11: the ACCC be given the power to investigate when it receives credible information 
indicating that a party to a franchising agreement, or agreements, may be engaging in conduct contrary to their 
obligations under the Franchising Code of Conduct.  
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Appendix 3 
Summary of 2010 amendments to the Code 
 
Amendments to the Franchising Code: 
• clause 20A: requires franchisors to inform franchisees, at least six months prior to the end of the franchise 
agreement, of their decision either to renew or not renew a franchise agreement 
• clause 23A: provides that nothing in the Code limits any obligation imposed by the common law, applicable in 
a state or territory, on the parties to a franchising agreement to act in good faith 
• subclause 29(8): incorporates a non-exhaustive list of behaviours that provide guidance to franchisees and 
franchisors of the conduct expected of them when engaging in dispute resolution under the Franchising 
Code. 
Amendments to the disclosure document: 
• franchisors to provide a statement that franchising is a business and, like any business, the franchise (or 
franchisor) could fail during the franchise term and this could have consequences for the franchisee 
• franchisors to disclose whether the franchisor will require the franchisee, through the franchise agreement, 
the operations manual (or equivalent), or any other means, to undertake significant capital expenditure that 
was not foreseen and, therefore, not disclosed by the franchisor before the franchisee entered into the 
franchise agreement 
• franchisors to disclose the circumstances in which the franchisor has unilaterally varied a franchise 
agreement in the last three financial years and the circumstances in which unilateral variations to the 
agreement may take place in the future 
• franchisors to state whether the franchisor will attribute costs their costs, including legal costs, incurred in 
dispute resolution to the franchisee 
• franchisors to disclose whether a confidentiality obligation will be imposed on the franchisee and the type of 
matters that would be covered by the obligation 
• franchisors to disclose whether the franchisor will amend the franchise agreement on or before transfer or 
novation of a franchise agreement and 
• franchisors to disclose the details of the process that will apply in determining arrangements to apply at the 
end of the agreement. 
Source: Explanatory Statement, Trade Practices (Industry Codes—Franchising) Amendment Regulations 2010 (No. 1) accessed 
24 October 2013. 
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Appendix 4 
Generic risk statement  
This disclosure document contains some of the information you need in order to make an informed decision 
about whether to enter into a franchise agreement. 
Entering into a franchise agreement is a serious undertaking. Franchising is a business and, like any business, the 
franchise (or franchisor) could fail during the franchise term. This could have consequences for the franchisee. 
A franchise agreement is legally binding on you if you sign it. 
You are entitled to a waiting period of 14 days before you enter into this agreement. 
If this is a new franchise agreement (not a renewal, extension, extension of the scope or transfer of an 
agreement), you will be entitled to a 7 day ‘cooling off’ period after signing the agreement, during which you 
may terminate the agreement. 
If you decide to terminate the agreement during the cooling off period, the franchisor must, within 14 days, 
return all payments (whether of money or of other valuable consideration) made by you to the franchisor under 
the agreement. However, the franchisor may deduct from this amount the franchisor’s reasonable expenses, if 
the expenses or their method of calculation have been set out in the agreement. 
Take your time, read all the documents carefully, talk to other franchisees and assess your own financial 
resources and capabilities to deal with the requirements of the franchised business. 
You should make your own enquiries about the franchise and about the business of the franchise. 
You should get independent legal, accounting and business advice before signing the franchise agreement. 
It is often prudent to prepare a business plan and projections for profit and cash flow. 
You should also consider educational courses, particularly if you have not operated a business before. 
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